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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1940, Attorney General (and future Supreme Court Justice) Robert H.
Jackson spoke to United States Attorneys about their duty not only to be
"diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement" but also "to be just" and to
"protect the spirit as well as the letter of our civil liberties."' His talk was
dedicated mostly to the relationship between the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the U.S. Attorneys in their shared pursuit of justice. On one hand,
he observed that "some measure of centralized control is necessary" to
ensure consistent interpretations and applications of the law, to prevent the
pursuit of "different conceptions of policy," to promote performance
standards, and to provide specialized assistance.2 On the other hand, he
acknowledged that a U.S. Attorney should rarely "be superseded in handling
of litigation" and that it would be "an unusual case in which his judgment
should be overruled." 3
Critics of George W. Bush's administration have charged that the
balance in federal law enforcement has tipped in the direction of too little
prosecutorial independence and too much centralized control. 4 One of their
prime examples is the discharge of eight U.S. Attorneys in late 2006,5 which
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I Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4-6
(1940).
2 Id. at 4.
3Id.
4 See, e.g., Scott Horsley, Gonzales Seeks Damage Repair with Prosecutors (NPR,
MORNING EDITION radio broadcast Mar. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9096741 (last visited Apr. 6,
2008) (quoting Senator Sheldon Whitehouse as saying: "What happened in this case
sends a signal [to U.S. Attorneys], really through intimidation by purge: Don't quarrel
with us any longer"); Charles Osgood, The Osgood File (CBS radio broadcast Mar. 20,
2007), available at http://www.wcbs880.com/pages/312054.php?contentType=4&
contented=380434 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (quoting legal analyst Andrew Cohen
observing: "We... see a very controlling Justice Department with very centralized
power, [and] obviously not a lot of tolerance for dissent.").
5 A ninth was discharged early in 2006, but has not been associated with the
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the media has labeled "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal."'6 The discharges have
led to allegations that DOJ influenced U.S. Attorneys' Offices to pursue the
President's partisan agenda by encouraging the overzealous pursuit of voting
rights cases and government corruption cases against Democrats and by
discharging individual U.S. Attorneys who resisted.7 The critics perceive the
firings as evidence of DOJ's overeagerness to serve White House political
interests in derogation of the institution's traditional commitment to the rule
of law.8
The centralization of authority within DOJ that the recent firings
exemplify can be seen as a mechanism that facilitates abuse of government
power because it enables the Attorney General and other high-ranking DOJ
officials to enforce prosecutorial decisions that promote partisan objectives,
either out of sympathy for the President's interests or in direct response to
White House importuning.9 Under this view, the natural solution to the
politicization of federal criminal prosecutions would be the development of
institutional structures that would accord greater respect to DOJ's
independence from the President,10 U.S. Attorneys' independence from the
Attorney General's Office, l l and lower-level prosecutors' independence
discharge controversy.
6 E.g., Ana Marie Cox, Washington Memo: File Not Found, TIME, Apr. 30, 2007, at
24 ("The U.S. Attorneys scandal has raised many more questions than it has
answered...."); Margaret Talev & Marisa Taylor, US. Attorneys Scandal: Senators
Prepare for Gonzales Censure Vote, MYRTLE BEACH SUN NEWS, May 18, 2007, at A3.
Other examples offered to support the perceived centralization of control have included
DOJ's endorsement of torture as an investigative tool, wiretap surveillance of U.S.
citizens without court authorization, and participation in the detention of suspected
terrorists in Guantanamo.
7 The details of the controversy are discussed infra Part III.
8 See, e.g., Editorial, Why This Scandal Matters, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 2007, at A18
("Justice Department headquarters has become deeply partisan.").
9 See, e.g., Michael Isikoff & Evan Thomas, Bush's Monica Problem, NEWSWEEK,
June 4, 2007, at 24, 27 (suggesting Monica Goodling's practice of hiring Republican
campaign contributors for non-political positions was "part of a... slow and stealthy
erosion of the independence of the Justice Department"); Alexis Simendinger,
Presidency--Politics Squared, NAT'L J., June 2, 2007, at 34, 39 ("The Bush White House
continued to put partisan politics ahead of the interests of the American people when it
fired U.S. attorneys and inserted politics into ongoing criminal prosecutions." (quoting
Howard Dean)).
10 See Simendinger, supra note 9 (discussing prior administrations' "firewalls"
between the President and DOJ that the Bush administration ignored); cf Note, Removing
Politics from the Justice Department: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform,
50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366, 369-72 (1975) (discussing post-Watergate proposals to de-
politicize DOJ).
11 See Horsley, supra note 4 (quoting Senator Sheldon Whitehouse regarding the
importance of preserving U.S. Attorneys' independence from DOJ).
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from all political appointees.12
A call to give lower-level prosecutors greater independence from higher
ranked officials would be strikingly at odds with one of the primary themes
of contemporary commentary on prosecutorial ethics. Prosecutorial
misconduct traditionally is considered to be the product of too much
independence, 13 particularly on the part of rogue prosecutors on the front
lines. 14 A more contemporary insight is that even well-intentioned
prosecutors are subject to biases that must be kept in check. 15 Proposed
solutions include the implementation of internal policies constraining
individual prosecutors' discretion,16 increased oversight and decision making
12 For example, before the Independent Counsel Act expired, some critics argued
that it would be preferable to assign prosecutions of federal officials to career prosecutors
because, functionally, they are least likely to act in a partisan fashion. See, e.g., Julie
O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 463, 475 (1996) ("DOJ prosecutors, who have a necessarily broader focus and are
privy to a store of institutional knowledge and experience, are better positioned to
exercise their discretion in a professional and equitable manner, and are accountable if
they do not.").
13 See Leonard R. Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrained by his Environment: A
New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
52, 54 (1981) (identifying prosecutorial discretion as "the shibboleth of critics who
question whether a system which handles like cases differently provides due process and
equal protection to the defendant"). One of the criticisms leveled at truly independent
counsel in government corruption cases has been that they expend too many resources
and engage in overzealous pursuit of crimes that may not exist. See, e.g., Abraham Dash,
The Office of the Independent Counsel and the Fatal Flaw: They are Left to Twist in the
Wind, 60 MD. L. REv. 26, 30-31 (2001) (discussing criticisms of Kenneth Starr and
Lawrence Walsh).
14 See, e.g., Felice F. Guerrieri, Comment, Law and Order: Redefining the
Relationship Between Prosecutors and the Police, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 353, 374-75 (2001)
(blaming "rogue prosecutors [in Illinois], or more specifically, overzealous prosecutors"
who are "led by their desire for convictions over their desire for justice"); Barry Tarlow,
RICO Report: Hit'em Where it Hurts, 27 CHAMPION 50, 59 (Apr. 2004) (endorsing
legislation authorizing payment of defense attorneys' fees because of bad-faith federal
prosecutions as forcing supervisors to "take notice when their office's budget suffers a
major shortfall because of the behavior of a rogue prosecutor").
15 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and
Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475, 479 (2006) (discussing prosecutors' natural "tendency
to develop a fierce loyalty to a particular version of events"); Alafair S. Burke, Improving
Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1587, 1593 (2006) ("[E]ven 'virtuous,' 'conscientious,' and 'prudent' prosecutors
fall prey to cognitive failures."); Keith A. Findlay & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 295 (2006)
(discussing the pervasiveness of "tunnel vision" in prosecutorial decision making).
16 See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 569 (1999) ("It has
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by supervisory personnel, 17 and the dis-aggregation of decision-making
authority. 18
The notion that prosecutorial discretion should be constrained through
supervisory oversight underlies the current distribution of authority in DOJ.
For example, without authorization by the Attorney General or a high-
ranking designee, a federal prosecutor may not subpoena a journalist,19 indict
a defendant on RICO or tax charges,20 or ask a corporation to waive
attorney-client privilege.21 Other potentially controversial decisions, such as
whether to seek the death penalty, are made on a centralized basis in
Washington, D.C..22 The Attorney General's supervisory and decision-
making role in these contexts was introduced as a way of formulating
measured policy on the issues, implementing federal law uniformly, and
checking overzealousness on the part of local U.S. Attorneys' offices and
line prosecutors. 23
long been believed that maximum fairness will be achieved by neutral rules and standards
to guide prosecutors' exercise of discretion.").
'7 See Burke, supra note 15, at 1621 ("Another possible method to mitigate the
influence of cognitive bias on prosecutorial decision making is to involve additional,
unbiased decisionmakers in the process."); Findlay & Scott, supra note 15, at 388 (urging
"[m]ultiple levels of case screening" to minimize tunnel vision by prosecutors).
18 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of
Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2000) (arguing
that separate prosecutors should make the quasi-adjudicative and advocacy-related
decisions in each matter).
19 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYs' MANUAL 9-13.400-9-13.410
(2d ed. 2004) (guidelines on the issuance of subpoenas to news media) [hereinafter
"USAM"].
2 0 Id. 9-110.101, 9-110.300-9-110.400 (guidelines for bringing RICO charges,
including requirement of Criminal Division approval); 6-4.010-6-4.311 (guidelines for
bringing tax charges).
21 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/mcnultymemo.pdf (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008).
22 USAM 9-10.040 (requiring all death-penalty eligible cases to be referred to DOJ
for the Attorney General's decision on whether to seek the death penalty); see generally
Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999).
23 See Conference, The Independent Counsel Process: Is it Broken and How Should
it Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1546 (1997) ("[T]he whole purpose of [DOJ
review procedures] is so that there can be a uniform, cohesive system of law
enforcement.., with the centralized control in Washington, to make sure that some
Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn't going off half-cocked in a way that would be
detrimental to law enforcement in general." (quoting former U.S. Attorney Robert
Fiske)).
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The events surrounding the recent firings of U.S. Attorneys offer an
occasion for reconsidering conventional wisdom about how prosecutorial
power should be allocated.24 Who should make which discretionary
decisions, and on what basis? In the federal context, authority must be
allocated among line Assistants, U.S. Attorneys, the Department of Justice,
and the President. With respect to state prosecutions, the issues are somewhat
different, because state and local prosecutors ordinarily are independently
elected and therefore do not serve at the pleasure of the state's chief
executive.
Our goal in analyzing the allocation of authority in criminal
prosecutions, particularly federal prosecutions, is not to resolve whether
Attorney General Gonzales was justified in discharging his subordinates in
2006. That issue depends on facts not yet available, as well as controversial
assumptions about the extent to which political considerations may affect
high-level federal personnel decisions. Rather, by addressing the broader
question of who should control federal prosecutorial discretion, we hope to
develop a better understanding of the complicated and multi-faceted roles of
the participants in the federal prosecutorial system.
The Attorney General and his immediate assistants must balance several
imperatives. As a cabinet official, the Attorney General is expected to
implement the President's law enforcement policy objectives, yet at the same
time must resist improper political influences (whatever those may be)25 and
presidential attempts to interfere with the prosecutor's traditional obligation
to do justice. 26 As the chief federal prosecutor and administrator responsible
for all federal law enforcement, the Attorney General must set appropriate
policies for prosecutions, attempt to ensure uniform application of the law
throughout the United States, and supervise his subordinate U.S. Attorneys'
24 This Article focuses on how prosecutorial power should be allocated among
prosecutors within a single chain of command. It does not consider how legislatures
should allocate authority among different prosecutorial entities. See generally James P.
Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting the Dilemma of
Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REv. 427 (1998)
(discussing the relative merits of delegating power to an Attorney General or Independent
Counsel in government corruption cases); Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander,
Perilous Executive Power-Perspectives on Special Prosecutors in New York, 16
HOFsTRA L. REv. 35, 42-45 (1987) (discussing the allocation of power between New
York district attorneys and the state attorney general).
25 See ELLIOTr RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27 (1976) (discussing
presidential influence on DOJ and noting the distinction between the "proper role of the
political process in the shaping of legal policies and the perversion of the legal process by
political pressure").
2 6 See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES 2-4 (1992) (discussing the
Attorney General's conflicting roles and ways various Attorneys General have balanced
them).
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
performances, while not interfering unduly with individual U.S. Attorneys'
own supervisory and administrative functions as heads of their offices. The
Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys alike must be mindful of line Assistant
U.S. Attorneys' familiarity with the facts of individual cases, their personal
obligations to serve justice in those cases, and (often) superior experience in
trying criminal cases. Each of these prosecutors technically is subordinate to
someone else-the President is the Attorney General's boss, the Attorney
General supervises the U.S. Attorneys, and the U.S. Attorneys are in charge
of line prosecutors-but each also must resist pressures from their superiors
that interfere with the exercise of discretion that logically should belong to
them.
Exploring the issues raised by the recent firings concerning who should
decide which questions and when it is appropriate for the superior officials to
demand compliance with their viewpoints can help the various participants in
the federal prosecution process (as well as observers) determine when
insistence, compliance, or resistance is appropriate. Because the Attorney
General performs multiple overlapping functions-as federal policy-maker,
administrator of multiple law enforcement agencies, manager of
prosecutorial and law enforcement resources, and supervisor of prosecutors
making case-sensitive decisions in individual matters-it may be that no
single set of answers is possible. In some situations, society may be served
best through the exercise of discretion by individual prosecutors, in others
through the exercise of individual discretion bounded by rules (such as those
found in the U.S. Attorney's Manual), in yet others through the exercise of
discretion reviewed in each case by supervisory authorities (e.g., DOJ), and
finally in others through fully centralized decision making by the Attorney
General. One's politics or view of law enforcement-how the balance should
be struck between defendants' rights and the interest in convicting guilty
defendants-inevitably will color one's assessment of the appropriate
allocation of authority in particular cases.
At the outset, it is possible to identify some broad categories of questions
relevant to the determination of who should control decision making. These
include: (1) what is the nature of the issue to be decided? (2) who is best
qualified to decide, by training, experience, or familiarity with the pertinent
facts and issues? (3) when someone must exercise discretion, who is most
likely to make biased or otherwise improperly-motivated decisions? (4)
whose exercise of discretion does the public have reason to fear on other
grounds? (5) who can be held accountable for an inappropriate decision? and
(6) which decision-making process is most efficient?
This Article will explore these questions by analyzing three hypothetical
scenarios loosely based on cases involved in the U.S. Attorney discharges
and offering our intuitions about when particular considerations assume
special significance. Unlike in the case of the U.S. Attorney firings, where
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the Attorney General or his subordinates evidently made retrospective
judgments about how the U.S. Attorneys functioned, the hypothetical cases
are framed prospectively; we do not ask whether, in hindsight, one
prosecutor "should have" brought particular charges but, rather, look forward
to how the decision should be made. Nevertheless, the forward-looking
inquiry inevitably informs one's judgment on the backward-looking question
of when it is appropriate for the Attorney General and his designees to
second-guess the actions of their subordinates.
Part II of the Article provides an institutional analysis of how decision
making ordinarily is, and should be, distributed among various prosecutors in
state and federal agencies. Part III describes the recent U.S. Attorney
discharges, and explains why the theory of centralizing prosecutorial
decisions is critical to understanding and evaluating the propriety of the
discharges. Parts IV through VI then analyze the three hypothetical
scenarios, each of which highlights a generic problem that interferes with the
implementation of ordinary theory about the best allocation of prosecutorial
decision making. These problems are: (1) the fact that prosecutorial decisions
often implicate multiple policy issues; (2) the difficulty in identifying
whether particular decisions are illegitimate, either because of the nature of
the decisions or the context in which they are made; and (3) the occasional
need to respond to bias or intentional misconduct by individual prosecutors.
Parts VII and VIII reach some conclusions about what the problems mean for
the ordinary allocation of prosecutorial decision making and for assessing the
U.S. Attorney discharge debate.
Much of this Article's analysis applies equally to state and federal
prosecutors' offices. However, because the federal law enforcement scheme
has unique additional characteristics, 27 the Article focuses on federal
prosecutions. 28 State and federal prosecutors' offices alike, however-as
well as observers and students of the prosecutorial function--can usefully
apply the basic structure and analysis the Article provides.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ALLOCATION OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The structure of federal law enforcement, including prosecutions, is
unique. At the lower level, however, local federal prosecutors' offices
27 Cf Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. L.J. 207, 235-40 (2000) (discussing inherent differences between state and
federal prosecutors).
28 For an excellent, though somewhat outdated, organizational analysis of the federal
prosecutorial regime and the interaction between DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices,
see JAMEs EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES (1978).
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resemble their state counterparts-with the exception that state district
attorneys, unlike U.S. Attorneys, typically are elected officials. 29 Because
most discussions of prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial misconduct
assume the paradigm of the traditional state district attorney's office, it is
worth describing how such offices operate. That will enable us both to
distinguish the federal scheme and to draw from our analysis lessons that are
equally applicable to state prosecutions.
A. The Structure of Decision Making in State Prosecutions
Most criminal prosecutions in the United States are conducted at the state
and local level, and are conducted by elected district, county, or city
attorneys and their appointed assistants.30 The structure of state prosecutors'
offices varies with their size: a city such as New York or Los Angeles will
have many assistant district attorneys and multiple offices and units. A
county attorney in a rural area may have a small staff of part-time assistant
prosecutors. 31 In both cases, the final decision maker regarding the conduct
of criminal prosecutions is the elected prosecutor. He ordinarily is
independent of the governor, mayor, or other chief executive.
Elected state prosecutors can take various approaches to allocating
decision-making authority. 32 They can influence lower level prosecutors'
decision making through the adoption of policies governing investigative,
charging, and sentencing decisions and by instructing assistants who serve in
supervisory roles. In a small prosecuting agency, the elected prosecutor can
have input into all important decisions in every case, but that is impractical in
large urban agencies. 33
The larger the agency, the more limited will be the proportion of
decisions that the elected prosecutor can make personally, as will be the
29 See Steven W. Perry, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., July 2006, at 11 (compiling data showing that all but four states elect the chief
local prosecutor).
30 See id. at 6 (noting that state prosecutors closed almost ten million felony and
misdemeanor cases in 2005).
31 See id. at 2 (finding that, in 2005, more than 25% of local prosecutors' offices had
a part-time chief prosecutor and approximately 30% did not employ full-time assistant
prosecutors).
32 See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH
A CRIME 3 (1969); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1971); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1523 (1981).
33 See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION: A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE 38 (1977) ("As the size of the office grows, the need for clear enunciation
of policy and techniques to see that it is actually being implemented increases.").
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amount of information he can review in making decisions. In each office,
therefore, the elected prosecutor must explicitly or implicitly determine the
optimal level of discretion to assign to line prosecutors, the extent to which
line prosecutors' discretion should be cabined by internal policies, and the
extent to which decisions should be made by supervisory prosecutors who,
while lacking each line prosecutor's detailed knowledge of case-specific
facts, ordinarily have broader experience with, and a better understanding of,
the office's policies and decision-making processes.
Centralization of authority can take three forms in state prosecutions: the
District Attorney or supervisory prosecutors, acting individually or by
committee, may make key decisions-including routine decisions (e.g.,
whether to, commence an investigation, make an arrest, indict, or take a
sentencing position)34 or more limited specific decisions involving
controversial or particularly weighty matters. 35 This is the most time-
consuming form of centralization, because it requires the high-ranking
prosecutors to consider all the relevant factual information about each case
they review.
A simpler option for providing some supervision and centralized
decision making is for the agency's upper echelon to provide oversight rather
than decide each case itself; in other words, supervisors or section chiefs will
review decisions proposed by line prosecutors and either authorize or veto
the decisions. Under this approach, the line prosecutors have primary
decision-making responsibility, with the supervisors providing a level of
review that varies depending on the nature and significance of each decision,
the line prosecutor's experience and trustworthiness, and other
considerations. But at least some deference is given to the line prosecutor
because of his familiarity with the facts, the office's interest in training junior
attorneys to make independent decisions, and time constraints.
The third method of centralizing decision making is for a District
Attorney, or high ranking designees, to establish policies that channel or
34 See generally Mellon et. al., supra note 13 (presenting an empirical study
describing practices in numerous prosecutors' offices and identifying ways organizational
differences affect the outcome of decisions).
35 For example, some prosecutors' offices employ committees of experienced
prosecutors to make death penalty decisions. See Bob Doucette, State May See More
Death Sentences, THE SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 16, 2003, at 3-A (referring to
committees in two Oklahoma counties); Natalie Singer, Maleng Applies Patient Method
to 3 Tough Cases, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 2, 2006, at Al (referring to a 6-member death
committee used in King County, Washington); cf John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial
Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide Whether To Seek the
Death Penalty, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2571, 2600-01 (1997) (proposing an independent
committee composed of appointees of the Governor, District Attorney, and the committee
itself to decide whether the death penalty should be sought).
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restrict line prosecutors' discretion. Such a policy might, for example,
provide standards for plea offers in particular types of cases 36 or deem
certain offenders ineligible for pretrial diversion.37
Prosecution offices typically employ a combination of these options,
establishing general policies, reviewing some cases fully, and providing
limited oversight in others. Few District Attorneys would allow. subordinate
prosecutors to act entirely independently, without direction through internal
policies (either formal or informal) and without supervision. But at the same
time, except in an extremely small office, a District Attorney cannot assume
responsibility for all decisions. The operative question therefore becomes
how to strike an appropriate balance between centralized and decentralized
decision making.
B. The Structure of Decision Making in Federal Prosecutions
If one were to consider only individual U.S. Attorneys' offices and only
their criminal prosecution functions, the comparison with state district
attorneys' offices would be fairly precise. As in state, county, and city
prosecution agencies, each federal district contains three levels of
prosecutors: the head U.S. Attorney, supervisory assistants, and line
prosecutors who handle the day-to-day cases. Because U.S. Attorneys'
offices range in size from medium to large,38 U.S. Attorneys, as a practical
matter, cannot review or handle each case themselves; some mix of
centralization and grant of discretion to lower-level attorneys is necessary.
One significant difference between U.S. Attorneys offices and state
agencies is that the U.S. Attorney in each district is appointed by,39 and
serves at the pleasure of, the President.40 In contrast, the state district
36 See, e.g., State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096 (N.J. 1998) (noting a standard plea
offer prescribed by the N.J. Attorney General for defendants charged with possessing
drugs near schools).
37 See, e.g., State v. Greenlee, 620 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Kan. 1980) (describing an
office policy foreclosing diversion for narcotics offenders).
38 There are 94 districts (with 93 U.S. Attorneys), typically headquartered in major
metropolitan areas. U.S. Dep't of Just., United States Attorney's Office,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). Local offices employ up to 350,
with only a few being very small. U.S. Dep't of Just., United States Attorney's Office for
the District of Columbia, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/AboutUs/index.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008) (noting that the District of Columbia has "the largest United States
Attorney's Office with over 350 Assistant United States Attorneys"); see also DAVID
BuRNHAm, ABOvE THE LAW 90 (1996) (discussing DOJ staffing); U.S. Dep't of Just.,
United States Attorney's Office, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/offices/index.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008) (providing links to information about each district).
39 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
40 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000); cf 28 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2000) (allowing the Attorney
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attorney is accountable to the electorate-which may affect some of the
policy decisions the district attorney makes. Although U.S. Attorneys are
answerable to the President, they rarely communicate directly with the
President. In that sense, they operate autonomously in making decisions
regarding how criminal matters should be prosecuted by their offices.41
The most significant differences in the structure of federal and state
prosecution regimes arise from the introduction of the Attorney General and
the centralized DOJ into the picture. The Attorney General cannot be
conceptualized simply as a super-district attorney or a super U.S. Attorney,
because he serves multiple functions. The Attorney General is not limited in
his activities to prosecuting criminal cases; he supervises all federal law
enforcement (including the FBI and DEA), is active in federal civil litigation
(some of which he delegates to U.S. Attorneys), serves on the President's
cabinet, and advises the President concerning all legal matters and the
intersection of law enforcement with other federal concerns.42 Moreover, in
setting the direction of DOJ, which he controls, the Attorney General does
far more than enforce criminal laws. DOJ has numerous departments and
divisions that establish and enforce federal regulatory policy, for example
regarding voting rights, civil rights, and immigration.43 Even in the criminal
field, DOJ has its own set of prosecutors working in specialized areas who
sometimes take responsibility or share responsibility with Assistant U.S.
Attorneys in particular matters. 44 The Attorney General, therefore, inevitably
has broader policy responsibilities and objectives, and is subject to different
kinds of political pressures and oversight, than U.S. Attorneys and their
subordinates.
The Attorney General's place on the federal executive organizational
chart-above the U.S. Attorneys, but answering to the President-is now
taken for granted.45 But this was not always the case. 46 The original
General to fill vacancies).
41 See Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel:
Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 379-80 (2001)
(describing various reasons for U.S. Attorneys' relative autonomy).
4 2 See generally CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 12-80 (1992) (discussing the Attorney
General's multiple roles).
43 Id. at 25-36 (describing DOJ's functions).
44 DOJ's Criminal Division alone, for example, currently has units dedicated to
cases involving organized crime, narcotics, and computer crime, among others. See U.S.
Dep't of Just., Criminal Division Organizational Chart, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
links/orgchart.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (providing DOJ's organizational chart).
45 In rare instances, when the President or officials close to the President become the
subject of criminal investigations, attorneys have been appointed to serve independently
from the Attorney General, either under an independent counsel statute or at the Attorney
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understanding was that the Attorney General "would take orders from
Congress, as well as the President, in representing the interests ofithe United
States. '47 Further, the position was conceived as "quasi-judicial," 48 a
conception that implies a degree of independence from other government
officials.49 Significantly, for our purposes, that conception is echoed in case
law and legal ethics provisions that associate the prosecutor's duty to "seek
justice" with the quasi-judicial nature of the prosecutor's role. 50
Equally interesting is the fact that the U.S. Attorneys originally served
independently of the Attorney General. Congress established the independent
position of "district attorney," the antecedent of today's U.S. Attorney, in
1789.51 The appointment of these attorneys was vested in the courts, rather
than the Attorney General, and he had no control of them.52 Four decades
later, supervisory authority over district attorneys was assigned to the newly
established Solicitor of the Treasury, based on their primary function of
defending the government in civil cases implicating the public fisc. 53 It was
not until 1861 that Congress, now focusing on the criminal prosecutorial
function, assigned the Attorney General authority to oversee district
attorneys. 54 Congress ultimately established the Department of Justice in
General's direction. Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the now-expired Independent Counsel Act).
46 For historical accounts of the role of the Attorney General, see CLAYTON, supra
note 42, at 3-9, 11-35; Wiener, supra note 41, at 373-76.
47 Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 581.
48 James R. Harvey III, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice
Representation ofAgency Clients, 37 WM. &MARY L. REv. 1569, 1578 (1996).
49 See BURNHAM, supra note 38, at 26 ("[F]rom the very beginning, the attorney
general was an unusual hybrid with inherently conflicting loyalties.").
50 See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?," 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612-18 (1999) (citing cases and ethics provisions).
51 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93; see Wiener, supra note 41, at
375-85 (discussing the development of the U.S. Attorney's Office).
52 See Harvey, supra note 48, at 1578 & n.49 (citing An Act to Establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, ch. 30, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789)); id at 1577-78 ("The
attorney general had no control over the conduct of litigation for most of the federal
government.").
53 Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, § 5, 4 Stat. 415 (authorizing the Solicitor of the
Treasury "to instruct the district attorneys ... in all matters and proceedings, appertaining
to suits in which the United States is a party, or interested, and cause them.., to report to
him from time to time, any information he may require in relation to the same").
54 Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 362, 12 Stat. 285 (charging the Attorney General
"with the general superintendence and direction of the attorneys and marshals of all the
districts in the United States and the Territories as to the manner of discharging their
respective duties").
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1870, placing the Attorney General at its head,55 designating U.S. Attorneys,
and bringing them within DOJ's ambit.56
Even after the establishment of DOJ, there were substantial practical
limits on the ability of an Attorney General to influence the work of the U.S.
Attorneys., The complexities of travel and communications made it difficult
for an Attorney General to learn what U.S. Attorneys throughout the country
were doing and to give them timely instructions. 57 Early U.S. Attorneys had
to function relatively autonomously. 58 The primary oversight mechanism
would have been the adoption of policies that individual U.S. Attorneys
would have been responsible for implementing. But the adoption of a DOJ
manual bringing together policies offering substantial guidance on
discretionary decision making is a modern development.59
Technically, however, the structure of DOJ did provide the Attorney
General with the legal authority to supervise U.S. Attorneys, or to delegate
supervisory authority to subordinate officials within the Department of
Justice. 60 The practical barriers to DOJ's direct involvement in local decision
making in the various districts disappeared with the advent of modern
communication and travel. Today, computer technology enables the
Department to receive, collect, and preserve massive amounts of information
55 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 ("Department of Justice Act").
56 The Department of Justice Act gave the Attorney General ultimate authority to
conduct or argue "any case in which the government is interested," to make rules and
regulations for the Department, and to supervise "the conduct and proceedings" of the
U.S. Attorneys. Id. at 163-64. That structural framework has continued since. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 501-530D.
57 Cf Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275, 281 (1989) ("Congress for almost a
century directed that criminal law enforcement responsibility be decentralized, entrusting
the bulk of such efforts to part-time district attorneys who had little contact with the
President and his subordinates in the nation's capital."); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-38, 70 (1994)
("[I]t made little sense to vest in the President centralized control over district attorneys,
given their distance from the center, and it would be fully understandable that they would
function relatively independently.").
58 See MARTIN MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER 177 (1968) (recounting that, before
becoming U.S. Attorney, Emory Buckner extracted a commitment that he could control
prosecution and hiring decisions); Wiener, supra note 41, at 378-80 (describing how U.S.
Attorneys operated without interference for 100 years).
59 The earliest judicial reference to a USAM alludes to Attorney General Brownell's
policy that federal prosecutors ordinarily not consent to nolo contendere pleas. United
States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Earlier decisions refer to DOJ
policies that evidently were not yet formally collected. See, e.g., Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 159 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (referring to a policy disfavoring civil
rights prosecutions).
60 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-530D (2000).
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from U.S. Attorneys' Offices, including filings and transcripts, and to
respond quickly. The Attorney General thus can assume responsibility for
aspects of decision making that traditionally would have been made by the
local U.S. Attorney, supervisors in the U.S. Attorney's Office, or line
assistants.
In practice, DOJ has exercised control fairly selectively through the
adoption of internal rules and regulations. Some of these rules require U.S.
Attorneys to cede categories of case-sensitive decisions to the Attorney
General (or his designee)--for example, whether or not to seek the death
penalty.61 Other regulations require U.S. Attorneys to obtain the approval of
the Attorney General for specific types of decisions made in the course of
investigating and charging defendants, including whether to immunize a
witness, whether to subpoena certain witnesses (e.g., a defense lawyer, a
journalist, or a family member of the target), or whether to bring certain
charges (e.g., tax or racketeering charges). 62
The net result is that DOJ can operate, if the Attorney General so desires,
more like a District Attorney's office and less like one aspect of a
confederation of individual District Attorney's offices. The issue of how to
allocate authority no longer is controlled by practical and technological
considerations. It has become, instead, a matter of prosecutorial philosophy.
C. Centralization and the Structure of Prosecutors' Offices
In medium or large prosecution agencies, state and federal alike, some
mix of centralized and line decision making is inevitable. Chief prosecutors
cannot make all decisions, though they may be responsible for them.
Conversely, line prosecutors should not be ceded unfettered discretion,
because they are largely unaccountable and are not in a position to assure that
policy matters are decided uniformly. In state district attorneys' offices and
within local U.S. Attorneys' offices, the possible mechanisms for
centralization are similar.63
The issues become somewhat different in the federal system with the
introduction of the Attorney General and DOJ for practical and substantive
reasons. Even with full computerization, distance makes continuous review
unwieldy; when time is of the essence, centralized decision making makes
sense only if particular issues are flagged by DOJ as needing submission and
approval. DOJ devotes only limited resources to overseeing local
prosecutions. The Attorney General himself will not be interested in routine
61 See supra note 22; see also USAM 9-2.400 (listing other decisions requiring
approval).
62 See supra notes 19-20.
63 See supra text accompanying note 32.
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criminal matters.
The nature of the supervisory review the DOJ attorneys engage in
therefore differs from the supervision that occurs within the prosecution
offices themselves-focusing less on the efficiency of the prosecutors they
oversee or procedural justice in each case than on broad policy issues and
visible or controversial political questions.
Centralization in decision making has obvious advantages and
disadvantages. In state cases and to some extent in federal cases in which the
Attorney General personally participates, involvement in decision making by
the chief prosecutor and those closest to him promotes democratic ideals; it
helps impose accountability on the person who answers most directly to the
electorate. When centralized decision making involves experienced
supervisory prosecutors, decisions will be made by those who have the
greatest knowledge and expertise, the closest ties to the traditions of the
prosecuting office, and the best understanding of the chief prosecutor's
expectations. Centralization promotes neutrality in the sense of consistency,
reducing the risk that similar cases will be decided differently in light of
disparate personal philosophies, predilections, or biases of low-level
prosecutors. 64 Insofar as higher-ranking prosecutors serve a supervisory
role-reviewing issues with line prosecutors in charge of investigations or
prosecutions and authorizing their decisions-they check abusive or
overzealous conduct on the part of line attorneys; supervisors can restrain the
impulse of prosecutors to pursue charges in unworthy cases because of
cognitive biases or the desire to advance their careers. 65
In offices with low personnel turnover, however, line prosecutors will be
relatively experienced, familiar with office traditions and policies, and
trained in the exercise of sound judgment. In these offices, delegating
authority to the trial attorneys is efficient. It reduces the demands on
supervisory personnel and saves the time of prosecutors who would
otherwise have to review routine cases with higher-ups.
64 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L.
REV. 837, 843 ("Prosecutors' offices, especially those that deal with a large volume of
similar cases, often adopt policies in order to promote consistency and administrative
efficiency.").
65 Some of these benefits of centralization can be achieved by hiring attorneys
committed to good governance, honing their judgment, and according them discretion
subject to modest supervision. Cf R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What
Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice, " 82
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 640 (2006) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is best
regulated "by focusing on what type of character traits prosecutors should possess or
strive to acquire"). But that is easier said than done. Because prosecutors' offices often
pay far less than large law firms, they typically must hire inexperienced lawyers lacking a
track record of sound decision making.
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Perhaps more significantly, supervisory attorneys who are unfamiliar
with the facts and history underlying individual cases ordinarily are not in the
optimal position to make routine prosecutorial decisions; line prosecutors
often have a better understanding of the strengths and deficiencies of their
cases. Moreover, a prosecutor who interviews or questions witnesses may not
be able to perfectly communicate to a supervisor his perceptions and
intuitions about the witnesses' credibility. Likewise, prosecutors who have
met and formed an impression of defendants may be unable to convey fully
why they believe particular defendants are honestly contrite, on one hand, or
remorseless, on the other. Thus, decision making by even inexperienced line
prosecutors with personal knowledge of the facts sometimes is better
informed than judgments by more senior supervisory lawyers who possess
incomplete information.
In several respects, the question of how to allocate prosecutorial
decision-making responsibility seems very different at the federal level than
in state regimes. First, two types of centralization are in play in federal
prosecutions: centralization of the decisions of line attorneys in individual
cases and centralization of decisions by U.S. Attorneys and their offices as a
whole. Attorneys General who exercise authority over, or try to influence,
U.S. Attorneys typically do not do so because of superior trial experience or
judgment; they instead impose policy decisions that may be driven by
substantive concerns, a desire for uniformity, a desire to minimize abuses of
discretion, or politics. The questions of which decisionmaker is more
trustworthy or more likely to act for improper reasons becomes highly
pertinent.
Similarly, although U.S. Attorneys rarely assume direct personal
responsibility for investigations and prosecutions, they are less removed from
individual cases than DOJ personnel. The U.S. Attorneys are better able to
track investigations and prosecutions on a day-to-day basis, more familiar
with the capabilities of the line prosecutors, and therefore better informed
about specific cases. If the issue potentially subject to centralized decision
making relates to office efficiency or prosecution strategy, the U.S. Attorney
is in a better position to evaluate the issues than the Attorney General.
Decision making at a subordinate level sometimes corrects for biases at
the top of a prosecution agency. A District Attorney's, Attorney General's, or
U.S. Attorney's 66 proximity to the electorate and other political arenas (e.g.,
Congress) is a double-edged sword.67 The chief prosecutor may be
66 U.S. Attorneys typically are politically active and may have personal political
agendas, though often to a lesser extent than elected prosecutors or officials in
Washington, D.C.
67 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 64, at 890-92 (discussing tensions between
accountability and prosecutorial neutrality).
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influenced by an illegitimate self-interest in reelection or political
advancement in situations where lower-level prosecutors would be less
affected by those interests.68
Nevertheless, the Attorney General, and by extension the President, are
the policymakers responsible for making decisions regarding law
enforcement writ large and for determining how federal law enforcement
resources should be distributed.69 Concern about politically-driven decision
making can be misplaced if it assumes that politics-responding to what the
electorate wants-is by definition irrelevant. 70 Although most students of the
prosecution function would agree that prosecutors should not make decisions
in individual cases according to what is popular, resource-allocation and
other politically-controversial judgments (e.g., whether to prosecute
marijuana use) can be informed by what citizens in the jurisdiction believe is
appropriate. U.S. Attorneys have no immunity, and should have no
immunity, from supervisory review regarding their implementation of the
executive's view of proper public policy; indeed, they serve at the will of the
President.71
The determination of when society is best served by centralized decision
making, particularly in the federal sphere, is therefore complex. The best
resolution necessarily varies from case to case, depending both on the
reasons for centralization and, sometimes, on the motivation of the
supervising prosecutors for centralizing authority. The following Parts set
forth some of the explanations offered for the firings of the U.S. Attorneys in
2006 and then consider three hypothetical scenarios as vehicles for analyzing
the issues.
68 See N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 683 (1996) (concluding that
assistant prosecutors may not work on a District Attorney's reelection campaign because
that would exacerbate the problem that "a District Attorney's partisan political activity
unavoidably compromises the ability of his or her office to act, and appear to act, in a
disinterested fashion").
6 9 See DANIEL MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 48 (1980) (arguing that the Attorney General's role inherently
encompasses politics).
70 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939, 960-61 (1997) ("[T]he idea that
prosecutors should be broadly responsive to the concerns of their community... runs
deep. Where reasonable minds might differ on how prosecutorial resources might be
deployed, community preferences are thought to be critical.").
71 Susan Low Bloch has suggested, however, that the original understanding of the
Attorney General's independent role is instructive on the question of whether the
Attorney General is "the attorney for the United States or for the President." Bloch,
supra note 47, at 625.
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III. THE U.S. ATrORNEY FIRINGS
In December of 2006, DOJ forced eight U.S. Attorneys to resign and
appointed replacements who, under a recent anti-terrorism law, could avoid
Senate confirmation. 72 Eventually the media took notice, questioning the
motivation for the discharges. The Department initially characterized the
firings as routine personnel matters,73 but both houses of Congress, led by a
Democratic majority, were skeptical and commenced investigation. To date,
the propriety of the discharges has not been determined to Congress's
satisfaction. Congress has not had complete access to potential evidence for
various reasons. Witnesses have refused to testify publicly and under oath,
asserting the Fifth Amendment 74 or executive privilege, 75 or have testified
that they do not recall significant conversations. 76 Relevant documents have
been withheld, again based on executive privilege. 77 Other documentary
evidence has been deleted and not yet recovered. 78 The evidence has been
emerging slowly and tortuously.
The explanations originally emanating from DOJ were that the U.S.
Attorneys had been asked to resign because of deficiencies in their
administrative or leadership abilities or because of inadequate commitment to
official Department policy. Some discharged U.S. Attorneys allegedly failed
72 The U.S. Attorney discharge controversy is described in Dismissal of U.S.
attorneys controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dismissal of U.S._attorneys
_controversy (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
73 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A2 ("Gonzales characterized the changes as routine personnel
decisions based on evaluations of each prosecutor's performance.").
74 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Aide to Gonzales Won't Testify, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2007, at A3 (describing Monica Goodling's refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment
grounds).
75 See, e.g., Peter Baker & Dan Eggen, New Privilege Claim by Bush Escalates
Clash Over Firings, WASH. POST, July 10, 2007, at A3 (reporting claim of executive
privilege "regarding requested testimony by former counsel Harriet E. Miers and former
political director Sara M. Taylor about the prosecutor firings").
76 See, e.g., David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Gonzales Endures Harsh Session with
Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at Al (reporting Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales "invoked a faulty memory more than 50 times" during Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings).
77 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush in Conflict with Lawmakers on Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at Al (predicting a "constitutional showdown over demands
from Capitol Hill for internal White House documents").
78 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Missing E-mail May be Related to Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at AI (describing Republican National Committee accounts used
by Karl Rove and 21 other White House Officials from which e-mails potentially related
to the firings were deleted).
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to vigorously pursue voter fraud cases, which had been established as a
departmental priority.7 9 Another allegedly did not adequately prosecute
immigration cases. 80
Testimony from the fired U.S. Attorneys and other DOJ personnel cast
doubt on these explanations, 81 which some observers have dismissed as
implausible. 82
Commentators have offered other possible explanations for the
discharges. Some surmise that the underlying motivation was to replace
prosecutors who had failed to ally themselves sufficiently with partisan
Republican ends, either by investigating or charging Republican officials (or
those with ties to them) for corruption 83 or by not prosecuting Democratic
officials for alleged corruption 84 and other Democrats for alleged violations
of voter registration laws. 85
79 D. Kyle Sampson, Attorney General Gonzales' former chief of staff, testified that
three prosecutors were fired because they failed to pursue voter fraud cases vigorously
enough. See David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Ex-Aide Disputes Gonzales Stand Over
Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at Al.
80 Id. (reporting testimony of D. Kyle Sampson that San Diego prosecutor Carol
Lam's failure to vigorously prosecute illegal immigration cases played a role in her
firing).
81 For example, James B. Comey, a Deputy Attorney General from 2003 to 2005,
testified positively about the work of five of the discharged U.S. Attorneys (i.e., John
McKay, Daniel Bogden, Paul Charlton, David Iglesias, and Carol Lam). He said that he
knew nothing negative about two others (i.e., H. E. Cummins and Margaret Chiara) and
opined that only one deserved to be ousted (i.e., Kevin Ryan). See David Johnston,
Ex-Justice Dept. Official Defends Ousted U.S. Attorneys, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at
A18.
82 See, e.g., Editorial, Gonzales v. Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A22
(describing the Attorney General's testimony as "merely laughable"); Editorial, The
Fantasy Behind the Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, Sec. 4, at 13 (dismissing as
"ludicrous" the claim that prosecutors were fired for failing to pursue legitimate voter-
fraud prosecutions).
83 Some have claimed Carol Lam of San Diego was fired because she secured the
conviction of Republican Congressman Randy Cunningham in 2005, and "was in hot
pursuit of defense contractors with administration connections." See Frank Rich,
Editorial, Iraq is the Ultimate Aphrodisiac, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, Sec. 4, at 13;
David Johnston & Eric Lipton, supra note 79. Others have speculated that Nevada
prosecutor Daniel Bogden was fired for investigating a Republican governor and
Arkansas prosecutor H. E. Cummins for investigating the Republican governor of
Missouri.
84 It has been suggested that Arizona prosecutor Paul Charlton was fired for failing
to bring charges against Democratic Congressman Rick Renzi before the November 2006
election. Editorial, Another Dubious Firing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A24.
85 Editorial, Still Waiting for Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, Sec. 4, at 11
("There is mounting evidence that many of the eight fired United States attorneys were
punished for refusing to prosecute Democrats on phony election-fraud charges."); Adam
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Other observers have speculated that the Bush administration sought to
advance the careers of lawyers loyal to the administration by appointing them
in the place of the discharged U.S. Attorneys.86
Underlying many of the explanations offered by DOJ officials and critics
alike are questions about the proper use of prosecutorial power and the
proper allocation of authority to exercise that power. Discharging U.S.
Attorneys, in practical effect, is a method for the President and Attorney
General to impose their views on local U.S. Attorneys' offices; discharge
serves both as a stick used against disobedient U.S. Attorneys and a carrot to
others still in office. It is therefore important to analyze the issue of whether
and when the central administration should be able to impose its will. An
equally important secondary issue is, even when centralized decision making
is appropriate, who should set the policies. Should the White House make
determinations concerning whether and how zealously federal prosecutors
pursue particular federal crimes (such as voter fraud or illegal immigration)?
Should these law enforcement policy decisions instead be left to the Attorney
General or professionals in DOJ? Or should they be ceded to the discretion of
individual U.S. Attorneys or their Assistants? Perhaps more importantly,
once centralized general policies have been adopted, should decisions about
how to implement them be left to individual prosecutors' discretion, be
overseen by U.S. Attorneys, or also be made by DOJ officials?
The charges of abuse in the recent U.S. Attorney firings leveled at White
House officials, Attorney General Gonzales, and DOJ personnel effectively
challenge conventional wisdom that decision making at the top serves as a
check on abuses at the bottom. The justifications offered for the discharges,
Cohen, A Woman Wrongly Convicted and a U.S. Attorney Who Kept His Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at A18 (observing that "[m]ost of the eight dismissed prosecutors
came from swing states, and Democrats suspect they may have been purged to make
room for prosecutors who would help Republicans win close elections").
Commentators also have suggested that other U.S. Attorneys were retained
specifically because of their willingness to use their power for political ends. For
example, before the Wisconsin gubernatorial election, the U.S. Attorney in Milwaukee,
Steven Biskupic, successfully prosecuted an official in the Democratic governor's
administration while the governor was running for reelection. When the conviction was
overturned for insufficient evidence, observers suggested that Biskupic had responded to
pressure by "turn[ing] a flimsy case into a campaign issue that nearly helped Republicans
win a pivotal governor's race." Id. Similarly, critics have suggested that New Jersey U.S.
Attorney Christopher Christie escaped being discharged because he publicly investigated
Senator Robert Menendez just before the election. See, e.g., Marisa Taylor & Margaret
Talev, Firings Show Encroaching Politics, NEWS & OBSERVER, June 19, 2007, at A4.
86 See; e.g., David Johnston & Eric Lipton, White House Said to Prompt Firing of
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at Al ("Justice Department officials have said
they removed the United States attorney in Arkansas earlier last year to make room for a
Republican Party lawyer and onetime adviser to Mr. Rove [Timothy Griffin].").
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involving both politically partisan and public policy objectives, also raise
questions about what constitutes overreaching by supervisory officials. The
following pages examine three hypothetical scenarios inspired by the current
controversy that, together, demonstrate the complexity of the issues.
IV. THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE DOMINANT
POLICY ISSUE
One risk of addressing the proper allocation of authority in the context of
matters prominent in the press is that the issues tend to become
oversimplified. In the U.S. Attorney discharge cases, the media and
Congressional overseers have tried to reduce the motivation of the central
administration and the actions of the U.S. Attorneys to simple conflicts of
will concerning a single policy to be implemented. Thus, critics allege that
the U.S. Attorneys wished to pursue political corruption investigations
wherever they led, while the White House wished federal prosecutors to
skew their investigations. The U.S. Attorneys allegedly wished to pursue the
most important crimes in their districts, while the central administration
wished them to focus on voter fraud and immigration cases that would
benefit the Republican Party or bolster the Party's political agenda.
Many situations in which a conflict develops between the central
authority and the subordinate involve the appropriate method of balancing
multiple, competing policies which all have validity. Depending on which is
to be preferred, arguably different prosecutors should control their
implementation. How the policies should be reconciled can present
intractable issues that subordinate prosecutors and supervisory personnel
need to work through carefully.
The following scenario provides a useful vehicle for considering this
problem.
Scenario 187: FBI investigators arrest Sanchez, a Mexican national
87 This scenario was based loosely on Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(2006) and Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); see also Mark J. Kadish & Charles
C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, The Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1186 (2006) (analyzing how the Vienna Convention affects
foreign defendants' legal rights); Sara M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations:
How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91
CAL. L. REv. 1729, 1739 (2003) (discussing the case law concerning the Vienna
Convention). Although these cases were not specifically mentioned in the U.S. Attorney
discharge debate, prosecutions of illegal immigrants generally have been discussed.
The question raised by this scenario involves the obligation under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rights to inform foreign nationals upon arrest that they have the
right to assistance from the consul of their own state. Recently, in Medellin v. Texas, 128
S. Ct. 1346 (2008), the Supreme Court held that in post-conviction proceedings, a state
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illegally in the United States, for a gang-related murder that violates federal
law. The Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the case participates in
Sanchez's interrogation. He considers whether, in addition to giving Miranda
warnings, he should advise Sanchez of his right to consult with Mexican
counsel.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which both the United
States and Mexico have signed, appears to require criminal prosecutors to
advise foreign nationals of their right to consult counsel from their own
country.88 This is a recurring issue for prosecutors in this district, which is in
a state bordering Mexico. The Assistant U.S. Attorney, recognizing that the
issue implicates law enforcement and foreign policy concerns, consults the
local U.S. Attorney, who in turn consults DOJ.
Should the Assistant U.S. Attorney give the additional warnings? Who
should decide, and on what basis?
A. What is the Policy Issue?
At one level, Scenario 1 implicates traditional law enforcement policy
questions that parallel the questions of whether to provide a suspect with
Miranda warnings,89 whether fairness militates in favor of providing
warnings beyond those legally required, and whether to forego warnings that
are required in order to achieve some other objective. 90 Initially, the
prosecutor must consider the effects of giving Vienna Convention warnings
on his ability to obtain a conviction of a guilty defendant. If this were a
simple Miranda warning, the prosecutor would have no question about what
to do. He would give the warning because it is constitutionally required,
unless he is prepared to prosecute the case without the fruits of the
interrogation. 91 Here, however, the additional warnings may not be
constitutionally required, so withholding them could, perhaps lawfully,
increase the likelihood of a conviction.
The prosecutor might nonetheless see a reason to offer consular counsel,
was no required to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice holding that the
state had violated the convention.
88 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Dec. 14, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77,
100-01.
89 Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969) (requiring the giving of prophylactic
warnings to defendants undergoing custodial interrogation).
90 Statements obtained in violation of Miranda can, for example, be useful in
locating victims, accumulating evidence against other suspects, and impeaching
defendants who testify at trial.
91 In other words, the prosecutor might withhold the warnings in order to obtain
information benefiting the government in ways other than its introduction in the
prosecution's case in chief against this defendant.
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rooted in his sense of procedural justice. Many foreign defendants do not
understand the American justice system. The Convention reflects the notion
that it is procedurally fair to provide access to a lawyer who is a compatriot,
to rectify the informational deficiency and to assure this defendant and other
foreign residents that the unfamiliar legal system will treat them
evenhandedly. American prosecutors need not give criminal defendants
warnings beyond Miranda, but they certainly may do so when they consider
it necessary to serve justice. They may advise juveniles to wait for parents,
self-destructive defendants that they should seek counsel, and less culpable
co-defendants that it is in their interests to make a deal with investigators
first. Ordinarily, whether to provide extra warnings is left to line prosecutors'
discretion.
Depending on his view of the obligation to serve justice, the Assistant
U.S. Attorney in Scenario 1 could even believe that this obligation requires
him to give unnecessary warnings. A court might not exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention, but the United States has
signed the Convention, and the warnings in at least that sense are legally
mandated. The prosecutor may consider it a first principle that law
enforcement personnel should comply with the law, regardless of how that
affects the case.
. Who, among the possible prosecution personnel, should reconcile these
competing considerations? Some would argue that, because personal and
fact-sensitive issues are in play, line prosecutors should be allowed to
exercise discretion. But supervisory prosecutors or the U.S. Attorney would
not be out of bounds in providing input into the decision or even establishing
an office policy resolving the matter. Arguably, the central administration in
Washington, D.C. could have input as well, perhaps by explaining how these
situations should be addressed in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. 92
But Scenario 1 is far more complex, because it implicates national law
enforcement policy issues as well. Gang-related murder is a state and federal
crime.93 Federal prosecutors must decide whether to cede primary
prosecuting authority to state prosecutors, on the one hand, or address the
issue on a federal basis because state resources are inadequate to deal with
gangs, on the other. The best answer to these questions may vary from
district to district. The relative importance of successfully prosecuting gang-
related crimes might influence the decision about whether to provide
possibly unnecessary warnings.
How to address crimes by illegal immigrants is another pressing national
92 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22 (referring to USAM policies).
93 See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 785
(1994) (discussing federal prosecutions of gangs under RICO and federal gun possession
prohibitions).
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law enforcement issue. There are many options, ranging from immediate
deportation to creating a deterrent through maximum prosecution. Again, one
might perceive the appropriate prosecutorial approach to warnings to be
case-sensitive (in which event the decision seems personal to the individual
Assistant U.S. Attorney), office-sensitive because it depends on the degree of
illegal immigration and crime by foreign nationals in the district (in which
case it falls into the purview of the U.S. Attorney making resource-allocation
decisions), or part of the national immigration debate (in which case
centralized decision making might be appropriate).
The problem of which policy is implicated becomes even more
complicated when one considers the foreign policy implications of
observing, or not observing, the Vienna Convention. A refusal to obey may
affect other countries' willingness to abide by the Convention's terms.
Conversely, other countries, including Mexico, may already be violating the
Convention; similar conduct by American prosecutors may be necessary to
encourage their compliance. Alternatively, America's willingness to comply
with the treaty provision, or non-compliance accompanied by a promise to
potentially comply, can be a bargaining chip in negotiations with foreign
countries about separate issues. Or, considered in the real world of foreign
relations, this provision may simply be viewed by all signatories to the
Convention as hortatory, meaning that signatories may comply or not as they
see fit.
Whether U.S. prosecutors abide by the apparent requirements of the
Vienna Convention can also affect the country's international standing. As
with America's use of torture at Abu Ghraib and denial of fair process in
Guantanamo, disregard of the Convention might brand the United States as
an international scofflaw or undermine America's credibility when seeking to
discourage other nations' violations of international law. Therefore, even if
the line prosecutor correctly determines that American courts would not
exclude evidence obtained in the absence of Convention warnings and that
withholding warnings would serve justice, the national government's interest
in maintaining appearances abroad might favor providing the warnings
nonetheless.
The nature of the Vienna Convention provision and the country's interest
in its enforcement, or non-enforcement, are issues that seem beyond the
competence of the line prosecutor and his immediate superiors. Even the
Attorney General may be out of his league, because such issues ordinarily are
controlled by the President and the Secretary of State. But some or all of the
prosecutors may have a role to play in considering whether law enforcement
policies rather than foreign policy concerns should be emphasized in
Scenario 1.
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B. Who is Best Able to Decide the Policy Issues?
Several potential decisionmakers can claim expertise in deciding how-the
prosecuting attorney in Scenario 1 should accommodate the competing law
enforcement interests. Before analyzing their relative competence on this
issue, it seems appropriate to exclude one potential decisionmaker from the
equation: the President.
Although both the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney serve. at the
pleasure of the President, the President ordinarily does not involve himself in
individual criminal prosecutions.
The fact that the Constitution gives the President pardon authority 94
suggests that he should not involve himself; if the President controlled
prosecutions, there would be no need for the pardon authority, because the
President could simply direct dismissal of a prosecution before a defendant is
convicted. As a practical matter, Presidents historically have not interjected
themselves into individual cases. 95 When they have attempted to do so, as
with President Richard Nixon's instruction to Attorney General Elliot
Richardson to discharge the special prosecutor investigating him, they have
ended up denying any intention to control the criminal justice process.96
The reasons for this practice of deferring to professional prosecutors are
not obvious. 97 Foreign leaders influence prosecutions; indeed, our own
presidents frequently negotiate with foreign leaders for the release of so-
called "political prisoners" and defendants they perceive to be victims of
"human rights violations." 98 And the President is the Chief Executive,
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
95 See NANCY V. BAKER, GENERAL ASHCRoFr 18 (2002) (describing a norm, before
John Ashcroft's tenure, of no White House interference in cases and nonpartisan decision
making by the Attorney General); Rory K. Little, Prosecution Politics, L.A. DAILY J.,
Mar. 22, 2007, at 8 (noting of the current scandal, "Only once before has it been seriously
alleged that the White House sought to remove a federal prosecutor based on substantive
unhappiness with his investigative decisions").
96 See Michael J. Glennon, Nine Ways to Avoid a Train Wreck. How Title 3 Should
be Changed, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159, 1166 (2002) (detailing Nixon's Executive Order
vowing not to remove the second Special Prosecutor assigned to investigate him, except
for "extraordinary improprieties").
97 For a good collection of arguments and authorities on the question of whether
Presidents should involve themselves in law enforcement decisions, see Note, supra note
10, at 424-34.
98 See Demetra K. Matsis, Guestworker Policies and Apartheid: Does One Resemble
the Other?, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 525, 556 (1991) (discussing President George H. W.
Bush's removal of economic sanctions against South Africa upon release of all political
prisoners); see also John J. Bowling & Jeff A. Cohen, When May a Sovereign Be Held
Liable for the Acts of Her Instrumentalities Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act? The Effect of the McKesson Decision, 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 285, 286 (1994)
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arguably in control of DOJ.
Nevertheless, the traditional presidential deference makes sense.
Presidents are not always lawyers, so they cannot be expected to understand
prosecutors' legal and ethical obligations.99 Neither presidents individually,
nor the office they occupy, have experience in reviewing criminal cases.
Presidents are not in a position, because of the demands on their time, to
personally learn the full details of even a single prosecution. Their familiarity
with law enforcement policy typically is limited to the information the
Attorney General provides.
Ordinarily, it is line prosecutors who are accorded discretion to
implement case-sensitive law enforcement concerns. They know the facts
best. They have first-hand knowledge regarding aspects of the case that
cannot be documented, including observations of the defendants' and
witnesses' sophistication and demeanor that might bear on how the
prosecution should proceed. Most importantly, the line prosecutor must live
with the consequences of his actions, particularly where, as here, he must
consider whether his conduct (e.g., failing to give Vienna Convention
warnings) would consist of a personal violation of the law.
In Scenario 1, many of the considerations relevant to the procedural
justice issues are indeed fact-sensitive, including the defendant's
sophistication, his language facility, and his familiarity with the American
criminal justice system. The nature of the crime, the defendant's criminal
history, and his personal attitude also might affect the calculus of whether
providing borderline warnings is appropriate. These factors militate in favor
of leaving the decision of how to proceed in the Assistant U.S. Attorney's
hands.
However, because the issue of whether to provide Vienna Convention
warnings will recur-both within the district and nationally-there may be
grounds for the Attorney General or the U.S. Attorney to influence the line
prosecutor's decision by adopting a policy governing all such cases.
Centralizing the policy judgment has several benefits. Centralization assures
that the outcome judged appropriate will be implemented uniformly, rather
than being based on each Assistant U.S. Attorney's idiosyncratic notion of
what is fair. A policy imposed by DOJ or the U.S. Attorney constrains
misconduct by prosecutors who are too concerned with obtaining
convictions. The policy also would educate inexperienced prosecutors, who
may not understand the issues regarding foreign defendants. The instruction
line prosecutors receive through the dissemination of a centralized regulation
(detailing the Algiers Accords under President Carter, which led to the release of Iranian
hostages).
99 There are significant exceptions, including William Howard Taft, a future U.S.
Supreme Court chief justice. See BAKER, supra note 26, at 14-15 (discussing presidents'
personal participation in legal decisions). President George W. Bush is not a lawyer.
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enables them to inform other law enforcement personnel of the potential need
for warnings, including investigators who otherwise might never consult an
Assistant U.S. Attorney. To the extent that the ultimate decision of whether
Vienna Convention warnings should be imparted depends on case-sensitive
facts, the centralized policy need not be rigid; it can provide guidance by
identifying relevant factors to be considered or can provide presumptions that
may be overcome in individual cases.
In Scenario 1, there is another reason to allow DOJ to decide how law
enforcement policies cut. One important issue is the nature of the Vienna
Convention requirement-whether it is operative law and in what sense.
Although Assistant U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Attorneys can research that legal
question, they are not experts in international law. DOJ, in contrast, has
offices specializing in such matters, including the Criminal Division's Office
of International Affairs1°° and the Office of Legal Counsel that advises the
President and Attorney General on the legal consequences of treaty
agreements. 101 Arguably, the expertise on the issue of whether prosecutors
violate American law by withholding Vienna Convention warnings lies in
DOJ.
DOJ, which includes the Solicitor General's Office, also has superior
expertise in predicting how American courts will respond to the
Convention's requirements. DOJ deals with American appellate courts on a
routine basis. 102 DOJ will be responsible for arguing the Vienna Convention
issues before the U.S. Supreme Court, giving it an incentive to decide the
issues correctly. 10 3 Because the Solicitor General ultimately must decide
whether to even make the argument that withholding warnings is lawful,
DOJ logically should be able to determine whether subordinate prosecutors
100 See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/links/oia.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (describing the
Office of International Affairs).
101 See U.S. Dep't of Just., Office of Legal Counsel, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008) (describing the Office of Legal Counsel); cf U.S. Department of
Just., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General (Feb. 18, 2008) (analyzing the affects of various treaties on the government's use
of torture), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/
dojtorture 123004mem.pdf.
102 U.S. Attorneys' Offices handle their own appeals, but the Appellate Section of
DOJ's Criminal Division reviews lower court decisions to determine in which cases to
seek review, appears in some appellate cases, and assists the Solicitor General's office in
preparing Supreme Court briefs. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Division, Appellate
Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/links/appellate.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
103 For a full discussion of the Solicitor General's influence on DOJ decision
making, see generally PETER N. UBERTACCIO III, LEARNED iN THE LAW AND POLMCS
(2005).
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may take that position. 104
More generally, when centralization of legal or policy decisions makes
sense because the issues recur nationwide and geographic distinctions are
irrelevant (or can be factored into the policy), the decisions should be made
at the highest level of criminal law enforcement-by the Attorney General or
his designees. In Scenario 1, for example, individual U.S. Attorneys have no
relative advantage in determining whether, to receive fair process, foreign
nationals must have access to consular attorneys. There is no reason to
believe that DOJ officials will have biases for which U.S. Attorneys must
correct. In evaluating the issue, DOJ also is in a position to obtain a wider
range of input-including input from all ninety-four U.S. Attorneys. In
contrast, when an issue recurs mainly within select districts, U.S. Attorneys
within those districts may have greater interest in developing a sound policy,
as well as superior expertise.
Should there be limits on the implementation of a central authority's
judgment? More specifically, does it make sense to allow DOJ or the U.S.
Attorney to adopt categorical internal regulations that deny line prosecutors
discretion to be more protective of defendants' rights than the law
requires? 105 Arguably the ethical obligation of prosecutors to "do justice"
implies the presence of case-by-case discretion to act in a defense-oriented
way. 10 6 Ensuring that line prosecutors are able to overrule categorical
policies in the interests of justice can serve as a check on institutional
overzealousness.
At some extreme, there must be some limit to supervisory authority. DOJ
and the U.S. Attorney ought not be allowed to require line prosecutors to
violate their own ethical responsibilities. Centralized policies, for example,
may not legitimately instruct line attorneys to prosecute innocent defendants
104 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 2 ("The solicitor general's office represents the
federal government in the Supreme Court and determines whether unfavorable lower
court decisions will be appealed.").
105 In other words, in Scenario 1, must the centralized policy preserve the line
prosecutor's discretion to give Vienna Convention warnings even in the absence of any
legal requirement?
106 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 309, 328 (2001) (discussing prosecutors' ethical obligation to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence where discovery rules and constitutional law do not
require disclosure); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable
Ethical Conflict of De Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEx. L. REv. 695, 706
(2007) ("Because the prosecutor's justice obligation requires the protection of the
innocent as well as... punishment of the guilty, the defendant is also among 'the people'
whom the prosecutor represents."); cf Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 69
(1991) (concluding that sometimes prosecutors' duty to serve justice requires them to act
in ways beneficial to defendants that are not legally mandated).
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or routinely violate Miranda.10 7 Similarly, a policy that constrains
subordinate prosecutors' discretion too much may forbid the prosecutors
from considering clearly relevant factors and thereby undermine the pursuit
of justice. But that speaks only to categorical policies of an unusually stark
type. DOJ policies typically are limited or presumptive rather than
categorical, because Justice Department officials understand the benefits of
prosecutorial discretion. 10 8 The choice between centralized and discretionary
decision making ordinarily does not reflect a situation in which either the
subordinate or supervising prosecutor advocates wrongdoing, but rather
reflects a disagreement about who should control a decision when there are
reasonable arguments on both sides.
Categorical rules--even categorical rules that foreclose benefits to some
defendants-have their place, particularly when they depend on the superior
ability of DOJ to make the policy judgment. In Scenario 1, other than an
innate sympathy for defendants or inherent distrust of convictions, there is no
reason to give line prosecutors a veto by concluding that their assessment of
the Vienna Convention is superior to DOJ's and that "justice" therefore
requires implementation of the Convention. A well-constructed policy or
articulation of principles that reduces line prosecutors' discretion in
individual cases promotes both uniformity and justice by reducing the risk
that line prosecutors will consider arbitrary or inapplicable factors. 109
Thus far, we have addressed only the question of who is best able to
develop and implement the narrow law enforcement policy that prosecutors
should serve justice in their individual cases. As we have seen, however,
107 Law enforcement personnel have no obligation to give Miranda warnings; they
simply risk having resulting evidence excluded if they withhold warnings. The U.S.
Supreme Court has, however, taken a dim view of efforts to circumvent Miranda based
on manipulations of the law. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004)
("Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by
training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."). The issue
of whether a supervisor may instruct a U.S. Attorney to violate Miranda in order to test
the law is discussed infra text accompanying note 114.
108 When DOJ declines to adopt a defendant-protective policy, it is not necessarily
instructing prosecutors to withhold protections. The absence of DOJ policy may simply
mean "the Attorney General leaves the issue to the U.S. Attorneys" or "the Attorney
General does not believe special protections should be given, but others may disagree."
Alternatively, it may be seen as a presumption that special protections (e.g., warnings)
should not be provided, but one which recognizes the possibility of exceptions.
109 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 64, at 853-59 (discussing impermissible
considerations for prosecutors). Conversely, forbidding DOJ to control the decision
through categorical instructions by definition would result in non-uniform decision
making regarding the Convention, despite DOJ's assessment that a single correct
approach exists. It is important to note that DOJ efforts to promote uniformity can benefit
or disadvantage defendants.
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national policy issues relating to law enforcement exist as well, including the
interest in having federal authorities address gang violence in an appropriate
way and national policy relating to crime by illegal immigrants. Is the
process best served through line-attorney or centralized decision making?
Line prosecutors may have the clearest insights into whether, based on
the facts, the defendants in their cases are guilty, deserve punishment, and
how much. They may have some, but probably limited, knowledge of the
nature of gang violence and the extent of crime by illegal immigrants in their
districts. They will not, however, have studied the issues of gang violence or
illegal immigration more broadly.
The question of whether federal prosecutorial resources should be
devoted to prosecuting gang violence has several facets. The first is relevant
to the line prosecutor's domain: did the particular defendant do something
dangerous and illegal for which he should be prosecuted? The Assistant U.S.
Attorney may be in the best position to make this assessment, but, if the U.S.
Attorney or designated supervisors in the office wish to review the specific
case, they can be brought up to speed.
The next set of issues relates to resource allocation, a subject about
which the Assistant U.S. Attorney is unlikely to be well informed. Are state
prosecutors already prosecuting the gang-related crimes the U.S. Attorney's
office is addressing, or would they prosecute adequately if the U.S.
Attorney's office did not do so? Do federal prosecutions that complement
state prosecutions provide significant additional deterrence of gang violence?
If the U.S. Attorney's Office did not focus on gang-related crimes, what
would the freed-up investigative and prosecutorial resources be used for, and
what is the better use? These are questions peculiarly within the expertise of
the U.S. Attorney, who should be familiar with the scope of all prosecutions
in his office, in contact with the local FBI concerning local crime, and
capable of conferring with state law enforcement officials. DOJ may have
expertise on this issue as well if one of its units has, for policy reasons,
engaged in a national study of gang-related crime and the capacity of the
federal government to ameliorate the problem. But if the Department has not
become invested in the issue, the Attorney General ordinarily should rely on
the U.S. Attorney's expertise.
The third set of issues is broader in nature. Is local gang-related criminal
activity a legitimate federal concern? To what extent is federal intervention
necessary to address the problem? Do state governments welcome federal
intervention in this arena, or do they believe it violates notions of
federalism?" 0 These are legal, sociological, and political issues which the
110 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (federalism-based challenge
to the federal government's use of federal narcotics prosecutions to nullify California's
statute authorizing possession and distribution of marijuana for medical purposes); Printz
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federal government should be deciding centrally and on the basis of
extensive study. Neither the line attorney nor the U.S. Attorney can speak for
anyone but himself in expressing an opinion on these issues.
What this suggests is that the Assistant U.S. Attorney's decision about
how to proceed against Sanchez in Scenario 1-including whether to take
extraordinary measures to convict him (e.g., by withholding Vienna
Convention warnings)-may be correct on the basis of the narrow law
enforcement concerns that line prosecutors typically consider in exercising
discretion, yet inconsistent with the U.S. Attorney's administrative decision
regarding the value of proceeding against gang defendants and/or the
Attorney General's or President's policy judgment regarding the national
government's role in the federal system.
The law enforcement policy issues relating to crime by illegal
immigrants highlight the dichotomy even more starkly. At one level,
prosecutors must decide whether criminal justice warrants prosecution, and
in what way. On the specific warnings issue in Scenario 1, the fact that the
defendant is in the country illegally (and that he joined a gang) seems to have
little bearing on how the prosecutor should proceed in his investigation,
because that factor does not affect the elements of the crime.
On a national level, however, how prosecutors address crimes involving
illegal immigrants-and whether they choose to give warnings not legally
required-can affect immigration policy. U.S. Attorneys in border states
such as Texas and California, may consider it their function and obligation to
their districts to help stem the tide of illegal immigration by forcefully
prosecuting all such crimes, including providing only the mandatory
procedural protections for defendants. 1 They may therefore agree with the
line attorney's assessment of the factual imperatives underlying the
individual case, but nevertheless encourage a different approach. For
deterrent purposes, the Attorney General might take the same position with
respect to all federal districts, even those in which the U.S. Attorney
perceives no special problem caused by illegal immigration; here, the
Attorney General in effect would be emphasizing the national policy
implications over the resistant U.S. Attorney's assessment of the optimal
allocation of resources in his district.
The reasons to prefer centralized decision making in these examples
might be the same as those discussed in connection with the narrow law
enforcement policy of achieving just results, but not necessarily. One might
adopt an internal policy for immigration-related cases to achieve uniform
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (upholding a county sheriff's challenge to a federal
law requiring state officials to enforce federal gun control procedures).
111 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 28, at x ("[U]nlike most other field personnel
implementing centrally determined policies ... [U.S. Attorneys] identify with the
community in which they serve.").
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decisions or implement the experts' legal judgment regarding Vienna
Convention warnings. But one might also control lower-level decisions for
reasons unrelated to the subordinate prosecutors' relative decision-making
expertise. If the centralized authority (i.e., DOJ or the U.S. Attorney) is
correct in its national policy judgment and if that factor-which an Assistant
U.S. Attorney might not even consider-is a legitimate basis for
prosecutorial decisions, there is every right to supersede the line prosecutor's
decisions. The subordinate attorney may have an argument that the policies
he wishes to effectuate are more important than, or should trump, the
independent values being implemented by the central authority, but the
subordinate has no argument that he is in the best position to make the
decision.
This becomes even clearer when we consider the foreign policy
implications of providing, or not providing, Vienna Convention warnings.
The Assistant U.S. Attorney who gives Sanchez the warning in Scenario 1
may do so on the assumptions that the Convention binds American
prosecutors and that it is in the federal government's interests for prosecutors
to comply with the Convention. We have already mentioned that the line
prosecutor or his U.S. Attorney might make the first assumption based on
legal research in an area in which they have less expertise than DOJ. They
have no basis at all for reaching the second conclusion, except for an
intuition that laws are meant to be obeyed. In the international arena of
negotiated obligations, however, that conclusion is not always true. Adhering
to it may in fact undermine federal interests (and endanger American citizens
in signatory countries that violate their obligations) in subsequent
negotiations.
Any argument that the subordinate prosecutors should themselves decide
whether to follow the Vienna Convention cannot be based on their superior
expertise in making such decisions, their superiority in evaluating the facts,
or their unique objectivity. Indeed, on some of the foreign relations issues,
the President (acting with the State Department) is the optimal
decisionmaker. He is best situated to identify international leaders' mutual
understanding of the Vienna Convention. Only the President can anticipate
future negotiations with Mexico and determine what approach to the
Convention warnings puts the country in the best negotiating position. The
President is best able to assess the likely affects of providing or withholding
warnings on the country's standing in the international community.1 12
To put it more baldly, what should the subordinate prosecutor (i.e., the
112 The decision of whether to seek extradition of a suspect or to allow extradition to
particular countries often implicates similar foreign policy issues. The need for a uniform
approach and for the government to act in a way the President is prepared to defend in the
international arena suggest that the President sometimes should have a role in the
decision making.
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line prosecutor or the U.S. Attorney) do if the Secretary of State accompanies
the Attorney General to a meeting in the prosecutor's office and together
they say: "The President's position is that the United States will not follow
the Vienna Convention until Mexico complies. So do not provide Convention
warnings to Sanchez. While you're at it, do not provide Miranda warnings
either." The subordinate prosecutors might reasonably respond that neither
the President nor the Attorney General has authority to command a Miranda
violation, because that contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of American
law. 13 Yet unless the prosecutors are certain that the Vienna Convention
reflects law of similar obligation, their response regarding consular counsel
cannot be the same. The subordinate prosecutors may not have the
wherewithal to make any judgment on the issue. If they do, and determine
that treaty obligations are often deemed negotiable, the only possible
justification for providing the warnings are that the law enforcement values
they are charged with implementing somehow take precedence over the
legitimate separate values that their superiors deem more important.
If we change the facts slightly, even the instruction to violate Miranda
can not be so easily resolved. Suppose DOJ concludes, after study, that the
new appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court make it likely that the Court
would overrule Miranda in cases in which an un-Mirandized confession is
voluntary. 114 Believing Miranda to have an adverse impact on federal law
enforcement, the Attorney General then issues an order forbidding federal
prosecutors to give Miranda warnings in cases in which resulting confessions
will be voluntary. May a line prosecutor demand the right to give Miranda
warnings nonetheless, on the grounds that Miranda is still the law?
It would be "ethical" for the Assistant U.S. Attorney to obey the
Attorney General's instruction; modern professional codes allow subordinate
attorneys to act "in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable
resolution of an arguable question of professional duty."' ' 15 Lawyers are
permitted to make claims in court that contradict prevailing law when they
have "a good faith argument for a ... modification [or] reversal."'1 6 If the
federal government is ever going to be able to challenge Miranda, line
prosecutors will have to preserve the claim at the trial level.
Although the dubious Assistant U.S. Attorney has a reasonable argument
that doing justice requires giving the warning, his superiors have an equally
113 See supra note 107.
114 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the
Rehnquist Court. The Sluggish Life of Political Facqinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1590 n.1
(2006) ("[A]lthough the Court declined to overrule Miranda v. Arizona in Dickerson v.
United States, it quickly followed Dickerson with cases sharply restricting Miranda's
scope." (citations omitted)).
115 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2002).
116 Id. R. 3.1.
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reasonable claim that they are ultimately responsible for the cases and may
overrule his judgment. There is a benefit to having such jurisprudential
policy judgments made at the central level, rather than by line prosecutors
whose case-by-case decisions are not reviewed, because the central
authority's determination will become public. When the centralized decision
to challenge Miranda is announced, accountability for the decision becomes
possible even before the cases reach the Supreme Court stage.
Suppose, however, that the President gives the command to challenge
Miranda. Must the Assistant U.S. Attorney-or for that matter the Attorney
General or U.S. Attorney-obey? Here one might conclude that the President
overstepped his authority, or at least acted beyond his level of competence.
Arguably, a legal judgment must be made, both on the merits of the
challenge and the ethics of withholding the warning. The President,
particularly a non-lawyer President, may need to leave those judgments to
the legal professionals. Conversely, the line prosecutor who believes he has
an ethical obligation to follow the existing law may not, under the prevailing
legal ethics codes, take a contrary position in reliance on the judgment of a
layperson-even a President who is technically his superior.
C. Whom Do We Trust to Make the Decision?
Having established that identifying the policy issues prosecutors must
decide can be difficult and that cases often encompass multiple policy issues,
it becomes hard to reach firm conclusions about when centralization of
authority is appropriate. Sometimes our intuitions about the proper allocation
of authority is colored by specific facts that give us a reason to distrust one
decisionmaker or the other-because of bias, his reliance upon improper
considerations, or special indications of untrustworthiness.11 7 Unlike many of
the cases involved in the recent U.S. Attorney firings, however, Scenario 1
offers a relatively routine law enforcement problem, with no extraordinary
motivational concerns. It simply highlights a variety of policy issues about
which different participants in the system have varying levels of interest and
expertise.
A few aspects of the scenario suggest potential grounds for questioning
the neutrality of some of the possible decisionmakers. Let us assume that the
answer to the legal question of whether the Vienna Convention binds
prosecutors, and would be enforced by courts, is uncertain. One intuition
might be that the decision of whether to give the warnings should be left to
the Assistant U.S. Attorney because his obligations and reputation are on the
line. His personal credibility with the courts, colleagues, and defense
attorneys will be affected by how he responds to uncertainty in the law.
117 These considerations are discussed infra Part VI.
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Arguably, no one should be able to tell a prosecutor to act in a way that he
deems is, or might be, illegal.
An equally powerful intuition, however, militates in the opposite
direction. Because the Assistant U.S. Attorney has a personal stake in the
outcome, he has incentives to make an incorrect decision on the law. He may
give warnings too readily, as a safe way to avoid potential criticism or
disciplinary repercussions. He may also wish to avoid the potential impact on
his own caseload if courts subsequently determine that warnings were
required. On the other hand, the line prosecutor's psychological and career
interests in earning convictions may cause him to withhold warnings too
readily. On either view, supervisory review by the U.S. Attorney or the
implementation of DOJ policies might be useful in ensuring that the balance
between convicting the guilty and safeguarding defendants' rights is struck
on the basis of appropriate considerations.
In choosing between centralized and line decision making here, it is
important to note that if a line prosecutor makes a decision for the wrong
reasons, little is likely to happen to him other than a reversal of a
conviction.118 In contrast, if the decision to give or withhold warnings
derives from a centralized regulation promulgated by DOJ or the U.S.
Attorney, some accountability results. Pressure can be brought to bear,
through the press and Congress, to counteract the decision. The U.S.
Attorney or the Attorney General will need to defend it. This accountability
creates pressure for the decisionmaker to get it right.
Observers who worry most about prosecutorial misconduct might argue
that "justice" requires a one-way ratchet protecting defendants' rights. In
other words, an Assistant U.S. Attorney must have leeway to give warnings
he deems necessary and the central authority should be empowered to require
the Assistant U.S. Attorney to give warnings even when he does not want to.
Conversely, however, the Assistant U.S. Attorney should not be allowed to
forgo the warnings in violation of a superior's command, nor should the
central authority be permitted to demand a potentially unlawful withholding
of warnings.
Although this approach is superficially appealing because it safeguards
defendants' legal rights, it probably reads too much into prosecutors'
obligation to serve justice. Prosecutors do not owe a duty to maximize
procedural protections for defendants to the exclusion of other interests. To
the contrary, implementing their obligation requires prosecutors to balance
all the competing considerations objectively, including society's and the
118 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 900 (1995) ("Reversal is not a true sanction, as it is not specifically directed towards
punishing the prosecutor.").
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victim's interest in obtaining convictions of the guilty) 1 9 It is, therefore,
wrong to assume that the concept of justice automatically mandates
prophylactic measures tilting the balance in defendants' favor or that
centralized judgments adverse to defendants necessarily are subject to veto
by all actors in the process.
As will be discussed in Part V, the likelihood of illegitimate motivation
on the part of a U.S. Attorney or Attorney General depends significantly on
the issues involved. Scenario 1 suggests no facts that would cause the U.S.
Attorney to reach decisions inconsistent with the natural exercise of his
expertise. This conclusion might change, however, if the particular U.S.
Attorney has political aspirations in the community in which he sits. Then,
his allocation of office resources to fight gang violence, for example, might
be colored by his political agenda; state law enforcement already addresses
gang violence and the decision may simply cater to potential constituents.
Even though the U.S. Attorney has the most expertise and the best
information to make local resource-allocation decisions, it may therefore be
appropriate for DOJ to intervene-at least for the purpose of performing a
limited review.
One can say the same about the Attorney General's and DOJ's decision
making. The officials in Washington, D.C. may not have a personal stake in
whether Vienna Convention warnings are given, but the President and his
party do have a political stake in appearing to combat illegal immigration.
Depending on how visible the specific immigration issues in Scenario 1 are
in the public press and depending on whether there is evidence of White
House involvement in DOJ's decision making, there may be grounds to
worry about DOJ's policy judgments. The problem, as in the recent discharge
cases, is that it is difficult to identify political interference in DOJ decisions
before those decisions are made. 120 More significantly, even if one suspects
DOJ's motivation, the possible alternative decisionmakers (e.g., the U.S.
Attorney and line Assistant U.S. Attorneys) may have limited or no expertise
in evaluating the national law enforcement interests.
D. Which Policy Considerations Should Trump?
Reasonable minds will differ about the best outcome in Scenario 1. Some
observers would emphasize the duty to assure procedural justice, others
would focus on broader national law enforcement concerns, and yet others
119 See Zacharias, supra note 106, at 57 ("The prosecutor is simultaneously
responsible for the community's protection, victims' desire for vengeance, defendants'
entitlement to a fair opportunity for vindication, and the state's need for a criminal justice
system that is efficient and appears fair.").
120 Part VI addresses this problem.
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would highlight the President's prerogative to control foreign affairs. Who
will decide is at root a matter of naked power; the President can fire the
Attorney General who fails to bend to his will, the Attorney General can set
policies that bind subordinate attorneys at pain of discharge, the U.S.
Attorney can supervise his staff, and the line Attorney can make his own
decisions in individual cases and suffer the consequences if those decisions
conflict with his superiors' commands.' 2 ' As a theoretical matter, however,
for each issue in Scenario 1, there are both better and worse decisionmakers
and varying levels of justification for centralization of authority. The
intractable problem Scenario I presents is not who should decide the policy
issues, but rather which policy issue should be treated as paramount.
The intuitions we have offered are nevertheless instructive. At one level,
they suggest that decision making in federal criminal cases should not be
allocated in an atomistic manner, simply by looking at the case presented and
determining who has the power to, or who should, decide the case. It would
often be wrong, for example, to conclude that a particular decision-say,
whether to allow arrested foreign nationals access to consular attorneys-
should be made by a particular player. It may be that several players should
have a voice, depending on why the particular decision is being made. Even
with respect to discrete aspects of the decision, optimal decision making may
entail a process through which lower and higher ranking prosecutors have
input.
Understanding the reasons why different members of the prosecution
corps are in the best position to make particular types of decisions informs all
participants regarding how to act. On the basic question of which policy issue
is most important in Scenario 1, there should be some give and take. The
Assistant U.S. Attorney must be able to discuss with his superiors his
judgment that individualized justice concerns should trump more general
concerns about immigration policy, yet the line prosecutor must also
recognize that a broader perspective exists. Conversely, the U.S. Attorney
should be prepared to explain his resource allocation decisions to the
Assistant U.S. Attorney who wishes to pursue a violent gang member, but
also acknowledge that he, like the Assistant U.S. Attorney, has an obligation
as a prosecutor to do justice in the individual case.
In light of our conclusions, one would not expect the Attorney General or
DOJ to implement centralized authority without consulting U.S. Attorneys
and their staffs. This can provide an opportunity to flesh out the competing
policy considerations and determine when the reasons for centralization are
present and when local or case-specific concerns militate in favor of a
different decision-making regime. If DOJ understands the underlying
121 Often, line prosecutors can disobey in ways that will escape their superiors'
attention. This, of course, raises questions of accountability.
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benefits and costs of centralization, it should become hesitant to impose
categorical regulations unless the legitimate purposes of centralization truly
will be furthered. Likewise, the U.S. Attorney who understands which sorts
of considerations are best implemented centrally and when local or line
evaluation of the issues makes the most sense will be in a better position to
resist improper influence from DOJ and to explain his reasons for doing so.
The recent firings of U.S. Attorneys, of course, implicate many issues
other than the intractable problem of identifying the dominant policy issues
and reconciling the emphases of the various prosecutors. Most notably, the
discharges raise questions about which policies prosecutorial officials may
legitimately pursue. The discharges also call into question whether and when
political considerations may influence the interaction between the President,
Attorney General, and the rest of the prosecution corps. The following
scenarios address these, and other, issues.
V. THE SEMANTIC AND SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING
NEUTRAL PROSECUTIONS, POLITICS, AND PARTISAN POLITICS
The furor surrounding the U.S. Attorney discharges has been fueled in
part by critics' perceptions that Attorney General Gonzales, acting at the
behest of or in sympathy with the President and his political advisors, was
trying to advance the Republican Party's partisan political agenda. 122 The
critics' view is that U.S. Attorneys forced to resign because of their lack of
commitment to the agenda in fact acted consistently with the traditional
prosecutorial obligation to promote justice: they were weeding out unworthy
cases and allocating prosecutorial resources to the crimes they deemed most
important. 123 In contrast, defenders of the Administration's position have
argued that the Attorney General acted legitimately in adopting national
criminal law enforcement policy and that, by resisting that policy, the
discharged U.S. Attorneys failed to do their jobs. 124
The two perspectives surfaced sharply in connection with the Attorney
General's apparent insistence that DOJ vigorously enforce laws against voter
fraud. This policy might have been designed to maintain the integrity of the
democratic process. Arguably, the choice was "political" only in the
122 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 8 (opining that DOJ officials were pressured into
pursuing partisan objectives).
123 See, e.g., David Iglesias, Op-Ed., Why I Was Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007,
at A21 ("What the critics, who don't have any experience as prosecutors, have asserted is
reprehensible-namely that I should have proceeded without having proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
124 See, e.g., Scott Darnell, Opinion, Attorney Deserved to be Fired, N.M. DAILY
LOBO, Mar. 26, 2007, at 4 ("In this case, it was easy to fire Iglesias, because he didn't
perform well on the job.").
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legitimate sense of reflecting a judgment about the relative importance of
pursuing voter fraud cases vis-A-vis other cases. 125 On the other hand, in the
aftermath of the close Presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, the Attorney
General's policy can just as easily be characterized as an attempt to promote
illegitimate political objectives-namely, to discourage legitimate
participation in the electoral process and to use federal law enforcement
resources to bolster the political prospects of proposed federal legislation that
would benefit Republican legislators and reduce the number of Democratic
voters. 126  The conflicting perspectives highlight the difficulty of
distinguishing-rhetorically and substantively-between legitimate and
illegitimate rationales for prosecutors' investigative and charging decisions.
Part IV illustrated that many discretionary decisions are multi-faceted
and call for a succession of judgments, some best made by one actor, some
best made by another. This Part focuses on the reality that many of the
decisions prosecutors make-including whether to commence an
investigation, bring (or decline to bring) criminal charges, offer a plea
bargain, or seek a particular sentence-can be characterized in a variety of
ways. This reality develops, at least in part, because most discretionary
decisions implicate multiple considerations. Viewed objectively, each of
those considerations might be the justification for the result.
To be sure, identifying the rationales for decisions can be difficult. In the
absence of judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
prosecutors ordinarily need not justify their choices publicly. For decisions
that prosecutors make unilaterally, typically no explanation is even
articulated privately within DOJ or the U.S. Attorney's Office. When a
prosecutor is influenced by unconscious biases, any rationale he does offer
may be pretextual or inaccurate. 127
125 Hardball (MSNBC News broadcast May 15, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR
9190841 ("Well, as I understand it, the so-called voter fraud problem was kind of the fire
that lit everybody up. They really believed there was systemic voter fraud going on."
(quoting discharged U.S. Attorney David Iglesias)).
126 Editorial, Special Prosecutor, or... : Assault on Elections Needs Full Airing,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 26, 2007, at B6 ("[I]t seems more and more apparent that behind
the U.S. attorney scandal is a blatant effort of the Justice Department to tamper with the
U.S. election process, trumping up voter fraud as an issue to intimidate voters and
suppress voting in the United States."). The proposed legislation to require voters to
possess government-issued identifications was defeated in the Senate in 2007, after being
characterized as "a modem day poll tax which could disenfranchise millions of
Americans, specifically seniors, minorities, youth, urban and rural voters and persons
with disabilities." Press Release, Democratic Nat'l Comm., Democrats Defeat Harmful
Voter ID Amendment (June 6, 2007), available at http://www.democrats.org/a/2007/06/
democratsdefea.php.
127 The problems associated with identifying prosecutors' motivations are explored
in Part VI.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Even when it is possible to decipher a prosecutor's rationale for a
decision, however, the question of whether the rationale is impermissibly
political, permissibly political, or apolitical is sometimes debatable. How one
resolves that issue in turn affects one's intuitions about whether the decision-
making process and its outcome are legitimate. Similarly, how one
characterizes the rationale, or rationales, for a decision-which
considerations one assumes are, or should be, dominant in the decision-
making process-can inform the determination of how best to allocate
decision-making authority.
Consider our second scenario:
Scenario 2128: After a news report discloses that Prude voted in an
election while on parole after a state criminal conviction, the FBI
investigates and determines that the story is correct. Prude is a registered
Democrat in a heavily Democratic city in a swing state. There is no direct
evidence that Prude, an unsophisticated convict, intentionally misrepresented
herself or knew that she was barred from voting. Although there is
circumstantial evidence, the case will be hard to prove.
The Republican administration is promoting federal legislation to make
voter registration more difficult. Democrats charge that the proposed
legislation is designed to eliminate potential Democratic voters in future
elections. Republicans counter that voter fraud is rampant throughout the
country and must be addressed. Although prosecutors could leave it to state
authorities to decide whether to seek parole revocation, a federal
prosecution and conviction of Prude and others like her could bolster the
administration's public position on this issue.
The President's chief political advisor mentions the Prude story to the
President, who in turn speaks to the Attorney General about it. The Attorney
128 Scenario 2 is based loosely on a federal prosecution described in Eric Lipton &
Ian Urbina, In 5-year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007,
at Al. The subject of voter fraud prosecutions has been prominent in the U.S. Attorney
discharge debate. E.g., Johnston & Lipton, supra note 79. Critics charge that despite
evidence disproving voter fraud as a serious problem, presidential strategist Karl Rove
encouraged DOJ to make voter fraud prosecutions a high criminal-justice priority,
particularly in Democratic strongholds. Besides potentially deterring Democratic voters,
the prosecutions would have bolstered Republican opposition to proposed legislation
liberalizing voter registration and supported Republican advocacy for "Voter ID"
legislation that would disproportionately impede poor and unsophisticated voters likely to
be Democrats. Some of the discharged U.S. Attorneys allegedly resisted pressure to bring
these cases shortly before the 2006 election, either because there was insufficient
evidence to justify prosecution or because their timing might be perceived as a misuse of
prosecutorial power for partisan ends. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Fired US. Attorney Says
Lawmakers Pressured Him, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2007, at A10 (reporting former U.S.
Attorney David Iglesias's belief that he was fired for not succumbing to pressure to speed
up probes of Democrats before the November 2006 election).
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General raises the issue with the US. Attorney in Prude's district. The
district is one with a heavy caseload, including many investigations and
potential indictments involving serious violent, white-collar, and narcotics
crimes. Before his conversation with the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney
would not have become involved in the Prude matter; he would have allowed
the FBI and the Assistant U.S. Attorney in charge of screening to determine
whether the case warrants prosecution. But after his conversation, he
discusses the matter with the line prosecutor.
Should the grand jury be asked to indict Prude? Who should decide, and
how?
A. Characterizing Prosecutorial Decisions
Scenario 2, like the earlier scenario, implicates a host of law enforcement
considerations. Some are highly abstract (such as the relative importance of
bringing voter fraud cases), while others are case-specific (such as whether
pursuing this case is appropriate given the potential difficulties of proof). In
theory, a federal prosecutor might take all of these considerations into
account. More likely, some or all of the considerations will be introduced by
prosecutors at several different levels. Joint decision making can occur
through a deliberative process among multiple prosecutors or through a
combination of upper-level policy making and individual deliberation
incorporating the policies.
Regardless of who makes the decision or by what process, any decision
that accounts for a broad range of law enforcement considerations can be
characterized in a variety of ways. Outside observers and even prosecutors
who participate in the decision may perceive one consideration or another to
have been dominant or, looking forward, may perceive that one consideration
or the other should be dominant in this type of decision. As will be discussed
presently, the characterization of the decision-how one explains the
decision-may affect one's view of whether a result is legitimate, who
should make (or should have made) the judgment in question, and in which
context the judgment should be made.
In Scenario 2, a decision to indict Prude can be characterized as a
partisan political decision. The reasoning process leading to the decision,
directly or indirectly, seems to have taken into account the impact of an
indictment on the President's legislative agenda. The various prosecutors are
aware, and some are emphasizing, that prosecutions of suspects for even
minor violations of the voting laws 129 will promote Republican-backed
129 An ineligible voter's crime of voting can be viewed as far less significant than
such voter fraud as stuffing ballot boxes, tampering with voting machines, registering
ineligible voters, buying votes, or barring or intimidating eligible voters.
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legislation and Republican electoral prospects at the expense of the opposing
party.
Other characterizations are equally plausible, however. Arguably, for
example, the decision is "political" in a more neutral sense; it reflects the
President's and/or the Attorney General's view of the proper role of DOJ.
Presidential candidates routinely promise to address narcotics crimes, illegal
immigration, political corruption, environmental and corporate crime, or
other legitimate targets of federal law enforcement. The electorate expects
successful candidates to appoint Attorneys General comfortable with their
vision and willing to change the emphasis of DOJ's law enforcement efforts
accordingly.130
Thus, if the President here instructed the Attorney General to use the
available law enforcement arsenal to target voter fraud, one can fairly
characterize that decision as political, but non-partisan; it reflects a view of
the significance of voter fraud as a national problem. Although a policy
seeking the elimination of voter fraud may please political allies of the
President and garner votes, that is because those allies are in sync with the
administration's policy and because the President is acting in an accountable
manner. An instruction from the Attorney General to prosecutors down the
chain might similarly be characterized as "political"-in a policy, but not
partisan, sense. Even the imposition of a zero-tolerance policy by DOJ,
which would radically alter line prosecutors' approach to voter fraud cases,
could in theory be justified as a legitimate tactical effort to maximize
deterrence.
A related way to characterize the charging decision in Scenario 2 is that
it is a national resource-allocation decision. The federal prosecution corps
allocates its resources at both a national and local level. At the national level,
support is divided among the various districts according to their needs.
Because federal law enforcement agencies cannot investigate and prosecute
all crimes, each must make choices about how to employ their resources-to
130 This Article has not focused on the ability of the President or the Attorney
General to influence decisions of their subordinates through the appointments process. It
would not be surprising to learn that presidents have extracted promises or pre-
commitments from Attorney General or U.S. Attorney candidates to behave in a certain
way, perhaps even with respect to particular cases. There arguably is a difference
between exploring shared political views and demanding compliance with a particular
position in advance, because the latter prevents the subordinate from making an informed
objective judgment on the issues when he needs to make a decision.
Many of the considerations discussed in this Article, including those relating to
when the President (or Attorney General) is suited to controlling a particular decision
apply equally to pre-appointment influence. Additional considerations include the
importance of allowing the superiors to vet candidates fully and the impracticality of
potential methods for preventing such influence. Because the subject warrants full and
separate analysis, it will not be addressed directly here.
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address the most serious crimes, to create maximum deterrence in the areas
of most concern, to enforce the laws fairly, or to focus on areas of particular
concern at that time in the country's history (e.g., drugs, corporate crime, or
homeland security). DOJ implements those choices by organizing its
Washington, D.C. units into areas of special need, focusing the efforts of
those units, and instructing U.S. Attorneys regarding the administration's
emphases. A decision to focus on voter fraud, and therefore to indict suspects
for seemingly low-level violations, can be seen as one such resource-
allocation decision.
Alternatively, the charging decision can be characterized as a local
resource-allocation decision. U.S. Attorneys set priorities for their districts,
advising the staff of the kinds of prosecutions the district should emphasize.
When individual matters are brought to Assistant U.S. Attorneys for potential
indictment, the Assistants screen the cases in light of the office's resource-
allocation directives: marijuana possession cases may not merit prosecution
and crimes that could just as easily be prosecuted under state law may be
disfavored; in a period of zero tolerance for drugs and gang violence, even
the marijuana cases may be pursued and simple assaults by gang members
prosecuted. Depending on the facts, whether or not to indict Prude can be
viewed either as a local resource-allocation decision directed by the U.S.
Attorney or a resource-sensitive screening decision by the individual
Assistant.
Finally, the decision of whether to proceed against Prude can be
characterized as an ordinary screening decision, in which the prosecutor's
office-usually through an Assistant U.S. Attomey-tries to achieve justice
in the individual case. Ordinary screening decisions involve a plethora of
considerations. These include the seriousness of the crime, defendant's
criminal history and relative culpability, 131 and the prosecutors' sense of
proportionality.132
The various characterizations bleed into each other. A "political"
decision in the policy sense can simultaneously be a "partisan" decision, and
the two features sometimes will be inseparable; the appeal of a policy
position may be precisely that it wins favor with the administration's political
constituency and thereby advances the party's prospects. Resource allocation
decisions also may have "political" characteristics; they invariably take
131 That is, compared to other defendants charged with the same crime.
132 See Uviller, supra note 18, at 1696 (noting that charging decisions should, in
part, be "a reflection of the customary level of punishment for crimes of the same
category"); cf Rory K. Little, Proportionality As an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in
Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 751 n.140 (1999) (proposing a
proportionality requirement for prosecutorial decisions made during investigations and
commenting that the "concept of proportionality would seem to be generally applicable in
any area in which prosecutorial discretion is permitted").
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account, from a policy perspective, of the importance of prosecuting
particular kinds of criminal conduct. 133 A simple "screening" decision based
on traditional concerns such as the strength of the evidence and the
individual's relative culpability is inevitably influenced by background
considerations about resource allocation; instinctively, screening prosecutors
emphasize more important cases.
The co-dependency of the rationales for prosecuting suggests that it often
is foolhardy to even attempt to characterize decisions. It also suggests,
however, that when viewed from the outside or from the perspectives of
different prosecutors involved in the decision-making process, many
discretionary decisions can be characterized in multiple ways, depending on
where the person doing the characterizing places the emphasis. As the
following pages illustrate, the differences in characterization matter.
B. Judging the Legitimacy of Differently-Characterized Decisions
How one characterizes a discretionary decision is significant for several
reasons. It will influence one's intuition about whether a particular decision
is legitimate. It may also have implications for one's intuition about who
should make the decision and the context in which the decision should be
made. When decision making appears to be illegitimate-because of its
nature, because decision-making authority is mis-allocated, or because the
decision has been made in an inappropriate context-prosecutors who
disagree with the decision may be justified in objecting, and observers may
be justified in criticizing.
1. Political decisions furthering partisan and legislative ends
In Scenario 2, the President, the Attorney General, and the U.S. Attorney
each may have exerted some influence on their subordinates to proceed in the
case against Prude, if only by taking the unusual step of discussing the case
with the subordinate. The Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney, and the
Assistant U.S. Attorney aware of their superiors must decide how to respond.
Their conclusion on whether their superior was justified in exerting influence
inevitably will depend on how they characterize the decision to indict Prude.
The Attorney General, for example, might feel bound to resist suggestions
from the President that Prude should be prosecuted if the Attorney General
views the decision as reflecting partisan politics, but not if he deems it a law
133 For example, a prosecutor cannot reasonably decide whether to use the office's
limited resources to pursue prosecutions for immigration violations, gang violence, or
voter fraud without forming a judgment, or accepting another person's judgment, about
the relative significance of the criminal conduct.
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enforcement policy decision. In turn, the U.S. Attorney might distinguish
between efforts by the Attorney General to adopt and express views on the
allocation of federal resources generally and an effort to control the district's
allocation of its own resources. The line prosecutor might resist an effort by
the U.S. Attorney to decide what fairness requires in the individual case, but
comply with a directive concerning office priorities.
The various prosecutors' reactions to their superiors' instructions will
depend both on their characterizations of their superiors' decisions and their
view of the propriety of resolving issues on the characterized basis. For
example, the first characterization of the decision to indict Prude-that it is
an expression of partisan politics-leads to an intuition that an indictment
would be illegitimate. No serious believer in the concept of prosecutorial
neutrality would accept prosecutorial decisions based merely on whether the
decisions help the prosecutor garner votes. 134 It seems equally improper for
prosecutors at any level of DOJ to consider whether a charging, declination,
or other decision will advance his party's electoral prospects. If one views
the White House's or Attorney General's commitment to strict enforcement
of voter fraud law as partisan, discharging U.S. Attorneys who do not join
the project is an abuse of power.
One may have a different intuition, however, if the decision is re-
characterized. For instance, the Attorney General may acknowledge that the
President's desire to use prosecutions to advance his legislative agenda is
partisan, and thus distasteful. 135 But the Attorney General may himself
justify the legislative agenda in a more neutral way. Stricter voter registration
laws, while incidentally favoring Republicans, will promote the valid law
enforcement policy objective of deterring voter fraud. Regularly prosecuting
low-level violators such as Prude in order to provide empirical support for
the proposed legislation, though political in some sense, is not partisan; it
furthers law enforcement policy.
Even as re-characterized, however, there is a good argument that such a
decision is improper because, ultimately, prosecutions must serve justice in
134 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 64, at 858, 869 (suggesting that prosecutorial
neutrality may include "the notion that the prosecutor should not base decisions on party
politics"); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts
of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J.
1, 4 (1990) (arguing that prosecutorial decisions "should be protected from political...
interests").
135 Historians have suggested that the Framers' initial decision to decentralize law
enforcement was based on the desire to limit the Attorney General's ability to serve the
demands of an overly-powerful executive branch. E.g., Bloch, supra note 47, at 578-79,
629; Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and
ChiefLitigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1978).
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each case being prosecuted, 136 not simply serve as a means to a legislative
end. That argument, however, must be analyzed in light of the fact that
prosecutions often are used as means to an end. For example, some
prosecutions are brought as leverage to obtain a minor defendant's testimony,
when otherwise the prosecution would be declined. So long as the prosecutor
does not seek the conviction of an innocent defendant, he ordinarily feels
justified in considering all the practical benefits of the prosecution. Why not
legislative benefits as well?
Our intuition is that practical benefits that are related to the particular
case being prosecuted differ from legislative benefits. When a screening
prosecutor indicts a less culpable defendant for the purpose of encouraging
his cooperation against more dangerous targets, the prosecutor still attempts
to produce individualized justice in the context of the whole case; ultimately,
he intends the less culpable defendant to be treated more leniently than the
more culpable defendants, and no innocent person will be sanctioned. In
contrast, the most charitable view of prosecutors who emphasize legislative
benefits is this: they might produce justice, but only long-term, and only if
new laws are passed and they lead to good results. That seems too attenuated
a concept.
To us, a decision to consider legislative benefits, therefore, is at best
quasi-legitimate; the decision can be viewed as proper only if confined to the
context of setting general policy that does not prevent prosecutors from
deciding how to proceed in cases on an individualized basis. Stated another
way, even the policymakers at DOJ (including the Attorney General) are
prosecutors who must keep in mind their ultimate obligation to serve justice
in individual matters. In Scenario 2, an Attorney General who perceives
legislative law enforcement benefits of prosecuting voter fraud should not be
willing to implement that judgment in a way that will interfere with fact-
sensitive decision making. The U.S. Attorney and line prosecutors would be
justified in resisting any suggestion to the contrary.
Of course, concluding that the decision to indict Prude would be
illegitimate if characterized as a partisan political decision and would
probably be illegitimate if characterized as a non-partisan legislative decision
does not mean that the decision could not be justified if characterized
differently. Even "political" judgments relating directly to law enforcement
concerns may sometimes be appropriate-for example, a prosecutorial
decision to crack down on voter fraud because the crime itself is particularly
serious.
How can one differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate decisions
136 Prosecutors are expected to avoid punishing innocent individuals, apply a sense
of proportionality (i.e., the punishment should fit the crime), and treat all defendants with
rough equality. See generally Green, supra note 50, at 634-36.
[Vol. 69:187
THE U.S. ATTORNEYS SCANDAL
that implement priorities? There is no magical formula. As suggested below,
however, what is legitimate seems to depend in part on how one
characterizes the decision, in part on who implements it, and in part on the
context in which the decision is made.
2. Decisions Characterized as Neutral Political, Resource-Allocation,
and Screening Decisions
Prosecutors and observers sometimes have grounds to question the
legitimacy even of decisions that rest on valid considerations. Concerns can
arise because an inappropriate prosecutor is deciding. Alternatively, those
questioning a decision may believe that decisions based on the particular
considerations--or characterized in a certain way-should be implemented
only in particular contexts.
In the abstract, it is clearly legitimate for some official in Scenario 2 to
make a political judgment about federal law enforcement priorities and to
decide where voter fraud fits into those priorities. However, characterizing
that choice as a political decision about national priorities almost by
definition suggests that the decision should be made centrally. The
determination of federal priorities must be based at least in part on what the
country needs at this time in its history and in part on what American citizens
want. One can argue about whether the President or the Attorney General
should make such national policy determinations. Previously, this Article
noted reasons why the President often should defer to the Attorney General
and lawyers at DOJ; arguably, they have a better grasp of what prosecutions
entail and what can be accomplished through vigorous enforcement of
federal criminal law. On the other hand, the elected President may be more in
touch with the country's practical needs. Whichever high-level official
controls, however, it seems clear that political decisions should be made
centrally and implemented centrally as well.
If, instead, one characterizes the decision of whether to pursue voter
fraud cases in Scenario 2 as a law enforcement resource-allocation decision,
it seems that the decision should be made by DOJ, through a combination of
central and local input. Among prosecutors, DOJ is best situated to identify
national needs and priorities and to offer support to districts that pursue
them.137 Yet each district is unique; the districts vary in the number of crimes
137 Various sections of DOJ's Criminal Division support U.S. Attorneys' Offices in
particularly important or complex categories of cases. For example, the Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, in addition to prosecuting cases itself and reviewing RICO
charges, offers assistance to U.S. Attorneys' Offices in their organized crime
prosecutions. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/links/ocrs.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (describing the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section). Other sections serve similar roles with
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they must address, the nature of those crimes, and the effect of those crimes
on the local communities. The U.S. Attorneys in each district arguably must
have leeway to adjust the national resource allocation instructions to take into
account local realities.
Given these intuitions about who should make particular types of
decisions, the context in which a decision is implemented inevitably will
affect how prosecutors and observers characterize it and their sense about its
legitimacy. Suppose that, having adopted a strict policy on voter fraud
prosecutions, the Attorney General (perhaps through a DOJ official)
telephones the Assistant U.S. Attorney screening Prude's case and informs
the Assistant U.S. Attorney that he must indict Prude because of the new
policy. The Attorney General has now entered the world of screening; in
context, the Assistant U.S. Attorney probably would characterize the
decision he must make as a local resource-allocation or screening decision,
rather than a political or national resource-allocation choice. He might
reasonably resist the supervisor's instruction, not because of the illegitimacy
of political or national resource-allocation decisions generally, but because in
context that is not the kind of decision that must be rendered.
Viewed as a local resource-allocation decision, the core issue becomes
whether a voter fraud case against Prude should be pursued in preference to
other possible cases in the district. By its nature, this type of determination
requires a familiarity with the range of cases that routinely are brought to the
prosecutor's office, as well as an assessment of the relative seriousness of the
crime and the deterrent effect that proceeding in this and similar cases will
have. The case-specific factors must be evaluated in light of any general
directives from the United States Attorney regarding district priorities. The
decision, therefore, is one that can best be made by a prosecutor in the U.S.
Attorney's Office who sees the facts of many cases and understands the flow
of crime in the district. A line prosecutor or an experienced supervisor can
play this role; because the U.S. Attorneys themselves typically have less
hands-on involvement with cases, they may be less suited to the task.
Alternatively, when the decision to be made in Scenario 2 is
characterized as a routine screening decision designed to achieve justice in
the individual case, a peculiarly fact-sensitive inquiry is necessary. The
question of Prude's indictment becomes one of faimess-should she be
indicted and on what charge. The appropriate decisionmaker is the prosecutor
who can delve into, and gain maximum familiarity with, the facts. Scenario 2
suggests, for example, that Prude might not have realized she was
committing a crime by voting. Evaluating that factor requires the
respect to public integrity, narcotics, computer, and terrorism-related crimes, as well as
child exploitation and obscenity. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Division
Organization Chart, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/links/orgchart.html.
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decisionmaker to make a personal assessment of the credibility of Prude's
denials after observing her demeanor. How to take that factor into account-
both in the extent to which lack of knowledge diminishes Prude's culpability
and the extent to which it might make conviction difficult-again requires
individualized assessments. The latter consideration, in particular, depends
on the line prosecutor's confidence in his own abilities to try the case.
The Attorney General does not know either the office's caseload and
capabilities or the individual facts of Prude's case and therefore,
prospectively, is in no position to evaluate the individualized considerations.
From the U.S. Attorney's or line prosecutors' perspective, it seems
illegitimate for DOJ to render a political or national resource-allocation
decision in a context in which a local resource-allocation or screening
decision must be made. 138
In short, the characterization of the decision matters to the assessment of
whether the decision is proper, both in the abstract and in how it is enforced.
C. The Implications of How Decisions Are Characterized
As Scenario 2 illustrates, when different levels of prosecutors try to
resolve the same issue-here, whether an ineligible voter should be
indicted-their decisions can be viewed in various ways. Each
characterization carries with it intuitions not only about which prosecutors
can best make the decision but also about the form the decision should take
and the context in which it should be implemented. Some varieties of
decisions seem inherently suited to generalized central decision making,
while others call for local, ad hoc decision making. As we have suggested,
for example, political decisions should usually be made centrally, but also be
implemented centrally-through policy directives telling subordinate
attorneys what they must take into account. Central authorities should not,
however, advert to those policies to supersede subordinates' implementation
of their own decision-making expertise in the context of screening cases.
Conversely, decisions best characterized as screening decisions should
be made at the line level because they are fact-sensitive.' 39 But line
138 Stated another way, the Assistant U.S. Attorney must make a screening decision,
and it would be illegitimate for him to rely exclusively on political considerations to do
that. As chief prosecutor, the Attorney General has authority to take responsibility for the
screening decision from the subordinate prosecutor and make it on his own. But if he
does, he must make it as a screening decision, using appropriate screening factors.
Ordinarily, he will not be able to make such a decision well, because he is not familiar
with the pertinent facts.
139 Of course, DOJ may legitimately influence charging decisions-particularly
decisions on recurring questions-through centralized supervision. Policies establishing
the standards to be applied regarding sufficiency of the evidence and proportionality of
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prosecutors making these decisions have no right to ignore other legitimate
decisions that are designed to constrain their discretion-including political
policy decisions by the Attorney General and resource-allocation decisions
by the U.S. Attorney. Moreover, a line prosecutor should not make decisions
at his level that are more properly made elsewhere. In other words, he should
not, for example, indict Prude because of his own view of what DOJ's
priorities should be. That would be making what we have characterized as a
political decision. The line prosecutor's relative competence is in making
screening, not political, determinations.
Problems arise when prosecutors try to assume decision-making
responsibility for an aspect of a prosecution which they are not well-suited to
control. In supervising subordinates and resisting superiors, prosecutors at all
levels need to engage in a measure of introspection. When the Attorney
General in Scenario 2 exerts influence on the U.S. Attorney, he should be
thinking about his proper role. One way to accomplish that is by considering
the nature of the decision he himself is making; is it a political judgment, a
national resource-allocation decision, or something else-perhaps more akin
to a screening decision in an individual case? Given our analysis of who is
best able to make the different kinds of decisions, the Attorney General's
characterization should inform him of whether he is exerting appropriate
influence. At some extremes, he should even come to the conclusion that a
particular kind of a decision is fundamentally illegitimate.
Similarly, when subordinate attorneys-like the recently discharged U.S.
Attorneys-are pressured to follow a particular course, their characterization
of the decision being influenced can help them decide whether to obey. It
may, for instance, be appropriate for an Attorney General to expect a U.S.
Attorney to obey a national resource-allocation decision that makes voter
fraud cases a priority, yet inappropriate to expect the U.S. Attorney in a
specific district rife with political corruption to emphasize voter fraud cases
to the exclusion of political corruption cases; the latter is a local resource-
allocation decision in which the U.S. Attorneys have greater expertise. Fairly
characterizing the decision to be made can help both the superior and
subordinate better understand their roles and help them work out their
differences. It can also inform the subordinate about when to take a stand and
when obedience to a superior's prerogative is the better course.
Scenario 2 teaches a final lesson that is significant for those observing,
and criticizing, prosecutorial decision making; namely, that accurately
punishment, for example, reasonably narrow the range of charging discretion. Centralized
guidelines can promote neutrality, transparency, consistency, and accountability. See
generally JACOBY, supra note 33 (arguing in favor of consistent screening policies).
Typically, these will be developed by seasoned career DOJ personnel with an
understanding of the traditions of federal criminal law enforcement and the theoretical
policy issues relating to the exercise of charging discretion.
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characterizing particular prosecutorial decisions can be a difficult endeavor.
The line between partisan political decisions, legitimate political decisions,
and national resource-allocation decisions often is blurred. That is why
labeling the Attorney General's actions with respect to the U.S. Attorney
discharges as "political" does not resolve the issues. Some kinds of
judgments that implicate controversial national policies are legitimate, while
others are not, and yet others are legitimate only in some contexts. Observers,
to be fair, must characterize carefully and acknowledge the difficulty in
drawing the lines.
VI. THE DIFFICULTY OF ACCOUNTING FOR PROBLEMS OF BIAS,
CORRUPTION, AND EXCESSIVE ZEAL
Parts IV and V have suggested that, if one can overcome the problem of
identifying and reconciling competing policy issues and the difficulty in
accurately characterizing the nature of particular decisions, then in theory
there are better and worse decisionmakers for each matter. Some issues lend
themselves to centralized decision making because of the expertise,
experience, or competence of the prosecutors who populate the central
administration. Centralized control can promote accountability, transparency,
and consistency in the decision-making process. Other issues, however,
especially those involving fact-sensitive determinations pertinent to the
implementation of individualized justice, are better suited to decision making
at a line level, or at a line level subject to review by local supervisors who
can become familiar with the facts.
Sometimes, however, the theory breaks down. That is because focusing
on the competencies of the actors does not take into account prosecutors who
act on personal biases 140 or engage in intentional misconduct. 141 The issue of
bias lies at the core of at least one set of cases prominent in the U.S. Attorney
firing controversy-those involving prosecutions for government corruption.
Whenever prosecutors in one administration target an official belonging
to the party out of power, or refrain from prosecuting their own party's
officials, accusations will surface that political appointees participating in the
decisions have acted for partisan ends. But if political appointees forgo
personal involvement, they leave the field to subordinate prosecutors who
140 Various kinds of prosecutorial biases are discussed in Green & Zacharias, supra
note 64, at 852-59.
141 As discussed in Part II, supervisory controls of various types-including the
imposition of centralized rules, the transfer of decision making regarding particular issues
to a higher level in DOJ, and routine review of line prosecutors' actions-can serve to
counteract unconscious bias and unintentional prosecutorial misconduct. But when a line
prosecutor is determined to act in disregard of supervisory guidance, a more direct
method of control may be required.
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may be driven, if not by their own partisan leanings, by other biases-
including the interest in publicity that comes from prosecuting high-profile
cases. Particularly in such cases, prosecutors at all levels may consciously
reach decisions based on impermissible considerations, abuse their power
unconsciously, or simply appear to engage in misconduct. Other prosecutors
may respond to apparent instances of biased decision making by pushing
back.142 Some observers inevitably will criticize any result as being
partisan, 143 as may the target and others who would exploit the
controversy. 144
The following scenario helps illustrate that merely determining who is in
the best position to make particular decisions does not provide a full answer
to the question of who should make them. Any analysis of prosecutorial
decision making and any framework for allocating prosecutorial authority
must also address the potential for improperly motivated behavior.
Scenario 3145: A U.S. Attorney establishes political corruption cases as a
142 Subordinate attorneys cannot control their supervisors' abuses in the same way
that the supervisors regulate subordinates, but they have several options for resisting
supervisory influence-including ignoring an instruction, challenging it, or bringing the
issue to someone higher in the chain of command. This Article does not address the issue
of when, if ever, it is appropriate for prosecutors to reinforce their independence by going
to the press or reporting other prosecutors' actions to outside authorities (e.g.,
professional disciplinary agencies or the courts).
143 FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORrrY 266 (1962) ("[Had I indicted the
Congressman,] [t]he papers would have applauded my fortitude.., or called my action
vindictive.., depending on their political slant.").
144 See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special
Prosecutors: An Organizational Perspective, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 79, 97 (2000)
(explaining the impossibility of "get[ting] partisan politics out of the criminal
investigation of high administration officials").
145 Scenario 3 is based on an amalgam of cases discussed in the course of the recent
U.S. Attorney firings. These include the corruption investigation of Republican
Congressman Jerry Lewis by U.S. Attorney Debra Yang, who resigned during the
investigation, see Adam Cohen, The US. Attorney, the G.O.P. Congressman and the
Timely Job Offer, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at A22; the conviction of Republican
Congressman Randy Cunningham by U.S. Attorney Carol Lam, who was subsequently
discharged, see id.; an investigation, undertaken by later-discharged U.S. Attorney David
Iglesias, of an alleged kickback scheme involving Democratic officials in New Mexico
that did not result in indictments prior to the 2006 elections, see Editorial, supra note 84;
the prosecution of an administrator working for Wisconsin's Democratic governor, which
culminated in the reversal of her conviction for insufficient evidence, see Cohen, supra
note 85; an investigation of New Jersey's Democratic Governor that became a campaign
issue, see Editorial, Another Layer of Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A 16; and the
prosecution of Alabama's Democratic governor, see Editorial, Questions About a
Governor's Fall, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A16. See also Dan Eggen, Former
attorney general alleges prosecution politically motivated, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct.
24, 2007, at A16 (reporting allegations that the U.S. Attorney in Pittsburgh targeted
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high priority for his district. The Office manages to convict a federal lobbyist
of improperly influencing governmental officials in violation offederal law.
Using his testimony as a cooperating witness, the Office obtains guilty pleas
from a Republican congressman and obtains indictments against other
lobbyists and campaign contributors to Republican causes. The Office has
successfully prosecuted several Republican state judges and city officials in
the past.
The press has repeatedly reported that the government of the city in
which the United States Attorney's Office is located is rife with corruption.
The city government includes high-level officers belonging to the Republican
and Democratic Parties. No Democrats have been charged in connection
with any political corruption case in the recent past.
The U.S. Attorney is a Republican. The Assistant U.S. Attorney in charge
of the district's political corruption unit is a Democrat. The prosecutions of
the defendants in the corruption cases have been very aggressive in both the
investigative methods and trial tactics used. They have indicted some
officials based on a novel and expansive reading of federal law and have
used their subpoena power and granted immunity to potential witnesses
liberally.
After discussions with representatives of the White House, the Attorney
General meets with the U.S. Attorney. He advises the U.S. Attorney that the
White House is disappointed that DOJ has been targeting Republican
supporters of the administration. The Attorney General also expresses his
own concern that no Democratic officials have been indicted. Finally, the
Attorney General asks the U.S. Attorney to look into the question of whether
his subordinate prosecutors have been overzealous or engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct in pursing the corruption cases.
Are these concerns legitimate, and how should they be addressed?
A. The Difficulty of Reconciling Supervisory Concerns with the
Exercise of Legitimate Prosecutorial Discretion
From the President's and Attorney General's perspective, Scenario 3
may reflect lower-level prosecutors running amok. The devotion of
prosecutorial resources to corruption cases may seem excessive to them.
Even acknowledging the validity of indicting corrupt federal legislators, the
relentless pursuit of campaign contributors and lobbyists arguably is not the
wisest priority when it means that other important types of prosecution are
set aside.
The indictment of only Republican officials also may signal potential
bias to the President and Attorney General. In a city rife with corruption, the
prominent Democrats for prosecution).
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absence of a single indictment against a Democrat suggests illegitimate
partisan decision making of the kind discussed in connection with Scenario
2. The fact that the prosecutor in charge of the corruption unit is a member of
the Democratic Party supports those concerns.
The reports of overzealous prosecution tactics, including potential
misconduct by line prosecutors in judging the sufficiency of the evidence and
in offering inducements to witnesses, is troubling. Quite apart from partisan
concerns, overzealousness undermines public confidence in federal
prosecutorial neutrality. It offends the ethic of objective prosecutorial
decision making, which considers fairness to defendants as well as the
public.
In the absence of these concerns, the well-intentioned Attorney General
might see no reason for DOJ to become involved in the matter. Ordinarily,
the Attorney General would advise the districts of the administration's
national priorities, but leave local resource-allocation decisions to the U.S.
Attorneys. In Scenario 3, the fact that the city in question is reportedly beset
by corrupt leaders seems to justify the Office's emphasis on corruption cases.
Nevertheless, the Office's single-minded focus is troubling, and may give
short shrift to DOJ's national law enforcement program. How should the
Attorney General resolve his dilemma?
Equally important, how should the Attorney General address his
concerns relating to bias in the prosecutions? DOJ is not in a good position to
evaluate the motivations of the lawyers who choose which cases to pursue;
here, the statistics raise concern, but they might be explained and justified by
the evidence that the FBI and line prosecutors have collected. Ordinarily,
supervision designed to control individual prosecutors' biases is best
accomplished through direct review of case decisions by immediate
superiors. Nevertheless, in Scenario 3, the Attorney General knows that the
local supervisors are well aware of the trend and have, to his knowledge,
made no adjustments.
The Attorney General typically would not even conceive of reviewing
tactical decisions by individual line prosecutors to determine whether they
have exhibited excessive zeal or engaged in misconduct. He would leave that
to the U.S. Attorney or to others in DOJ. The Attorney General has no time
to review line prosecutors' practices, and little expertise in doing so. When
ordinary supervisory oversight is insufficient, the favored method of
preventing abuses of discretion centrally is to develop regulations that guide
line decision making; DOJ already has some regulations governing
prosecutors' evaluations of the sufficiency of the evidence and the granting
of immunity. 146 For particular tactics especially prone to abuse, including the
146 See, e.g., USAM 9-2.010 (guidelines on investigation and charging discretion);
9-23.100-9-23.400 (guidelines on granting witnesses immunity).
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misuse of subpoena power, DOJ sometimes establishes mechanisms for
reviewing the use of those tactics by every prosecutor in every case.147 But
the subpoenas in Scenario 3 do not fall within the parameters of the existing
regulations.
Our point here is not to determine what the Attorney General should do
in this instance, but rather to illustrate the reasonableness of his impulse to
intervene. The actions of the local U.S. Attorney's Office are happening on
his watch. The instinct of any superior who perceives improprieties by his
subordinates is to rectify the situation (including, potentially, by discharging
the subordinate). Presumably, as chief prosecutor, the Attorney General, like
his subordinate prosecutors, has the obligation to see that justice is done,
even if he ordinarily pursues that goal in a centralized manner. This case
seems to require a departure from typical remedies or the supervisory
procedures that are already in place.
B. The Difficulty of Reconciling Deference to Superiors with Potential
Supervisory Abuse
In connection with Scenario 2, this Article preliminarily noted the
uncomfortable position in which subordinates find themselves when they
believe a superior is implementing a partisan political decision. The
subordinates must first determine whether the decision is legitimate and then
must select an appropriate response. Scenario 3 highlights the difficulty of
making these assessments.
The Attorney General's unusual step of personally discussing the U.S.
Attorney's allocation of resources to corruption investigations cannot help
but raise a red flag. The U.S. Attorney presumably can respect the Attorney
General's desire to encourage prosecutions consistent with pre-established
DOJ policy. The Attorney General, after all, is the U.S. Attorney's direct
superior and clearly has authority to review his decisions. When the Attorney
General mentions the President's concern for party loyalists, however, the
inquiry smacks of bias. No U.S. Attorney who takes seriously the notion of
impartial decision making would listen to a plea for leniency by a
defendant's well-connected friends.
Any suggestion by the Attorney General that Democrats should be
prosecuted would worsen the U.S. Attorney's dilemma. The foundation of
prosecutorial screening discretion is that prosecutors should make
determinations based on evidence that investigators present, rather than a
political agenda. The U.S. Attorney in Scenario 3 knows that it would be
inappropriate for him to instruct his own subordinates to "find a Democrat to
prosecute," or to target a particular Democratic official for investigation.
147 See supra text accompanying note 62.
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From the U.S. Attorney's perspective, while it might have been appropriate
for the Attorney General to request that the U.S. Attorney exercise his own
supervisory authority to review the motivations of his staff, the couching of
such a request in partisan terms is grounds for suspicion.
Misconduct or overzealousness by line prosecutors is a subject that U.S.
Attorneys must address as part of their direct supervisory responsibility.
Typically, they delegate that task to the intermediate supervisors or unit
chiefs, who have personal experience in prosecutions that enables them to
identify misconduct. In potentially egregious cases, or ones like Scenario 3 in
which the conduct of a unit chief himself is questioned, a U.S. Attorney
might take the time to review the facts personally. Nevertheless, the fact that
the Attorney General's allegation of misconduct is accompanied by partisan
rhetoric may cause the U.S. Attorney to doubt his superior's good faith.
C. Reasons for the Conundrum of Unascertainable Motives
Thus far, we have simply illustrated that, in Scenario 3, the various
prosecutors' suspicions concerning the propriety of other prosecutors'
motivations justifiably trouble them. The suspicions give both the superior
and subordinate prosecutors reasons to consider departing from the normal
procedures they would follow and their normal assumptions about how to
interact. But Scenario 3 highlights something much more significant.
Namely, that particular kinds of cases inevitably will present issues that make
routine decision making, and the question of who within DOJ should decide
which matters, unusually complicated.
Investigative and charging decisions in government corruption cases, for
example, have an inherently partisan effect. When an indictment is brought
against a federal official or someone who has solicited an improper official
act, the indictment almost by definition has partisan consequences; publicity
surrounding the indictment helps or hurts the current administration's party.
Any action by administration officials that might influence the charging
decision, however proper, will be perceived by some (including the
subordinates being influenced) as being politically motivated. Conversely,
any action by the U.S. Attorney's Office that damages the governing party
will be perceived by party loyalists as unnecessary or a poor use of law
enforcement resources. Cases involved in the recent U.S. Attorney
discharges provide examples in both directions. 148
148 In the discharge debate, U.S. Attorney's Offices in various districts have been
viewed as overzealous or underzealous in pursuing government corruption cases. See
supra text accompanying note 83 and note 145. Quite apart from the merits of the
allegations of partisan influence in these cases, it is clear that whatever action the U.S.
Attorneys took would have been perceived by members of one party or the other as
illegitimate.
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In Scenario 3, the suspicions of the U.S. Attorney are triggered not only
by the Attorney General's intervention but also by his frank reference to the
White House's concerns. 149 In reality, however, the nature of the underlying
corruption cases alone might have provided a foundation for the U.S.
Attorney's suspicions about the Attorney General's motivation. The party
affiliations of each member of the prosecution corps color how their actions
are perceived by other prosecutors and observers of the prosecutions. The
fact that sophisticated participants typically avoid expressing improper
motivations makes it all the more difficult to respond.
Consider, for example, the relationship among the U.S. Attorney and the
lower-level prosecutors in Scenario 3. If the Republican U.S. Attorney
reviews the work of the Democratic unit chief-conducting supervision that
may be fully appropriate because of the controversial and highly-publicized
nature of the prosecutions-the unit chief may suspect partisan interference.
Conversely, in light of the pattern of prosecutions, the U.S. Attorney may
worry about partisanship on the part of the Democratic unit chief (or perhaps
his subordinates). The suspicion arises because corruption cases are
inherently political in nature.
Promoting partisan political interests is only one of several clearly
illegitimate bases for prosecutorial conduct. Others include self-interest,
prejudice, and religious zeal. 150 In many cases, the suspicion that a
prosecutor is implementing these motivations stems from particular conduct,
or particular characteristics, of the prosecutor himself. But there are instances
other than corruption cases, especially matters involving controversial issues
such as race, abortion, and immigration, in which the nature of a case itself is
likely to engender suspicion.
Scenario 3 highlights more generally the difficulty of crafting
appropriate supervisory responses to actions by subordinate attorneys that
may be driven by improper motivation. The ordinary criteria for supervisory
controls rest on the assumption that prosecutors at each level of DOJ will at
least try to perform their functions in accordance with their obligations to
seek justice. The supervisory controls therefore are (or should in theory be)
designed on the basis of who is in the best position to make particular
decisions. Routine review of fact-sensitive decision making ordinarily is
conducted at a relatively low level, by experienced supervisors who are in a
position to familiarize themselves with individualized considerations relevant
to the specific cases. Centralized controls are used to establish general
149 Even where an Attorney General's rhetoric is superficially non-partisan,
illegitimate intentions may be implied or left unspoken.
150 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 64, at 852-53 ("[I]t may seem axiomatic that
prosecutors should not rely on criteria such as race and gender, self-interest, idiosyncratic
personal beliefs, or partisan politics in exercising their discretion.").
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policies that guide and harmonize all prosecutors' choices or impose
appropriate systemic constraints on the discretion that can be exercised.
When the assumption of well-intentioned decision making is removed,
however, the ability to rely on ordinary controls disappears. From the top-
down perspective, a subordinate prosecutor who would consciously make
decisions based on improper considerations will not easily be influenced by
general centralized policies. Extraordinary methods may be necessary to
prevent deliberate misconduct that is not counteracted by the immediate
supervisors' routine review. From the bottom-up perspective, when
supervisors seem willing to act on partisan or other improper motives, the
reasons for deferring to the supervisors disappear. The subordinate
prosecutor must resist the supervisory influence if he is to fulfill his personal
obligations.
The problem in cases like Scenario 3 is that actual motivation is difficult
to ascertain by anyone other than the actor himself. Even after the fact, it can
rarely be proven. The Attorney General's intentions in Scenario 3, for
example, can simultaneously be interpreted as corrupt (i.e., encouraging
prosecutions of disfavored persons-Democrats-regardless of their guilt),
biased (i.e., interfering with valid prosecutions against Republicans), and
perfectly legitimate (i.e., addressing excessive zeal and prosecutorial
misconduct at the lower levels of the U.S. Attorneys' office). While the
subordinate prosecutors responding to the Attorney General or the U.S.
Attorney may have no choice but to judge the motivations of their superiors,
they can not be sure of their assessments.
Likewise, the U.S. Attorney and his staff, or individual members of his
staff, may well be exercising their discretion consistently with the Office's
tradition of acting upon the evidence. Yet it is possible that some of them are
pursuing illegitimate (e.g., partisan or glory-seeking) objectives. And even if
the subordinate prosecutors are acting without improper motivation but are
engaging in tactical misconduct or exercising too much zeal, higher
authorities should intervene.
D. Some Ramifications of the Conundrum
Scenario 3 challenges our earlier intuitions about the proper allocation of
decision-making authority in prosecutors' offices. The potential for
intentional misconduct and improperly-motivated prosecutorial decision
making by both superior and subordinate prosecutors undermines the various
actors' willingness and ability to rely upon centralized regulation or the
ordinary logic of a chain of command. The problem of who should decide
particular questions can no longer be resolved by resort to standard
organizational theory-which is based on the various actors' typical
incentives and relative expertise.
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To make matters more complicated, Scenario 3 illustrates that the
various actors in the process ordinarily must respond without being certain of
the motivations of the others. 151 Thus, even when improper motivation of a
supervisor or subordinate might call for a response that departs from the
norm, the supervisor or subordinate can rarely be secure in the knowledge
that a departure is justified. Typically, the subordinate will be acting on
suspicion and gut feeling alone. That is particularly troubling because, in
cases like Scenario 3, the nature of the case alone gives rise to suspicion.
At one level, the conundrum created by the potential for improper
motivation simply suggests that no account of the appropriate allocation of
prosecutorial decision making should rely exclusively on notions of
efficiency and institutional competencies. The human factor must be filtered
in. At a second level, the conundrum suggests that prosecutorial agencies,
like DOJ, should institutionalize procedures and practices that help minimize
those departures from normal decision making that are necessary. The
agencies can do so both by encouraging dialogue between supervisors and
subordinates and creating opportunities for joint decision making through
which the reasons for prosecutors' actions become more transparent, at least
internally within DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Transparency, in turn,
often will increase accountability.
Thus, DOJ might begin by identifying categories of cases, such as
corruption cases, in which participants are most likely to act, or appear to act,
on improper motivations. Initially, some of the potential problems can be
limited by adopting policies ex ante that decide some of the controversial
issues that have to be made in these cases. For example, there is some dispute
among federal prosecutors about the level of proof prosecutors should
possess before indicting elected officials, particularly high-level officials
such as the President.' 52 There is a question of whether the charging standard
should be different for the indictment of state officials because of federalism
concerns and state prosecutors' concurrent jurisdiction. The issue of when it
is appropriate to indict an official who is in the process of running for office
also is controversial, because the indictment might influence elections. By
deciding these issues centrally and in advance-behind a veil of ignorance as
to whether the policy will apply to Democratic or Republican targets-DOJ
151 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 54-75 (discussing mutual perceptions of U.S.
Attorneys and DOJ).
152 See Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities
of an Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2127 (1998) ("There is one exception to
the rule that the same discretionary factors should be applied equally to all
defendants .... An independent counsel faced with the question of whether to indict the
President of the United States should apply a higher standard. .. because an indictment
of the President raises very serious constitutional and practical concerns ... [including]
international repercussions.").
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can reduce the likelihood that individual prosecutors who follow the pre-
existing policy will be suspected of improper motives.
Centralized policies regarding the allocation of decision-making
authority also can anticipate issues that arise because of individual
prosecutors' personal characteristics. DOJ could require that any
investigation into political corruption involve prosecutors of both political
parties. Recusal policies or rules specifying special supervision might
regulate the participation of prosecutors in cases that implicate their strongly
held philosophical, political, or religious beliefs (e.g., death penalty or
assisted suicide cases).
It would, of course, be impossible to predict and resolve in advance all
issues that might implicate partisanship, bias, or other improper motives.
Prosecution agencies therefore should develop procedures to minimize the
effects of the conundrum of unascertainable motives. As a general matter, the
greater the number of prosecutors who are involved in a particular decision
and the more that prosecutors from different levels of the agency participate,
the less likely it is that a single prosecutor's improper motivation will drive
the decision. Collaborative decision making also improves the quality of
prosecutorial decisions because prosecutors at different levels have special
attributes that they bring to the table. For example, an investigating Assistant
U.S. Attorney knows the facts; supervisors within the U.S. Attorney's Office
serve as a check on the Assistant's zeal; the U.S. Attorney and his executive
assistants often have familiarity with the capabilities of local prosecutors and
an overview of resource allocation within the office; DOJ personnel can
provide insights into the meaning of DOJ policy. Although the Attorney
General's participation in decisions may tend to skew the decisions, the
Attorney General's official participation also will limit his partisanship by
increasing his accountability.
We do not suggest that all these DOJ actors should participate in all
decision making. That would be unworkable. The pressured line prosecutor
has no time to consult regarding every decision. A universal practice of
collaboration would tend to intimidate line prosecutors and retard the
development of their own ability to make reasoned judgments. And
prosecutorial resource limitations simply do not permit the participation of
multiple prosecutors in too many matters.
Nevertheless, it would be possible for the agency to develop a policy or
practice of encouraging deliberative collaboration in specific decisions in
categories of controversial cases. Presumably an Attorney General would be
personally involved in only a few decisions even within the limited number
of federal corruption cases; these might include the initial decision to indict
and any subsequent decisions to dismiss a case. Alternatively, to reduce
concerns about partisanship, the Attorney General (who is closest to the
White House and so most commonly identified as a partisan player) might
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adopt a policy to abstain altogether from involvement in individual
corruption cases, delegating his authority to career prosecutors in DOJ.
Conversely, Assistant U.S. Attorneys handling a particular matter would
need to participate in most discussions because of their familiarity with the
facts. Other prosecutors would be involved as appropriate.
The key is that the participation of multiple prosecutors in the
conversation requires prosecutors to state the reason for their positions and
make a case for them when a dispute arises. The presence of peers will limit
each prosecutor's willingness to take inappropriate stances. It will also
require prosecutors to express their orientation publicly and take
responsibility for it.
Collaborative decision making can develop spontaneously, but there are
reasons to formalize the practice. First, too much collaborative decision
making will hamstring the prosecuting agency's work; not all prosecutors
can be involved in all decisions. A policy judgment therefore may be
required regarding the categories of cases and types of decisions within those
cases that implicate the concerns mandating collaborative deliberation.
Second, it is valuable to identify in advance which prosecutors should be
involved in particular decisions, because the selection process itself might
otherwise be grounds to suspect improper motivation. Third, collaborative
decision making loses its value if, as a practical matter, it becomes a venue in
which higher-level prosecutors simply dictate results to subordinates.
Guidance therefore must be provided to all the participants regarding which
considerations are legitimate and who the optimal decisionmakers are with
respect to different aspects of a decision.1 53 Constraining the collaborative
discussion through policies, regulations, and practice can help the
participants judge each others' positions and make each hesitant to over-exert
his influence.
Thus far, we have suggested ways in which Scenario 3 is useful for
understanding the proper allocation of prosecutorial decision making. With
respect to the U.S. Attorney firings, however, Scenario 3 also helps with a
different inquiry. It explains how even well-meaning critics and defenders of
the administration's actions can so vociferously maintain their opposing
positions.
From the perspective of the administration's defenders, the discharges
were clearly appropriate. The Attorney General was exercising a routine
supervisory function. He had set law enforcement priorities, indisputably his
153 Thus, for example, the Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, line prosecutor, and
others in the room all should be advised that, when they discuss whether to indict,
considerations of partisan politics are out of bounds. They also should be made to
understand that the U.S. Attorney and Assistant working on the case are most familiar
with the facts and thus in the best position to resolve evidentiary issues relating to the
indictment decision.
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prerogative, and some of the U.S. Attorneys did not effectively implement
them. From the critics' perspective, the Attorney General sought to pursue
partisan objectives. The discharged U.S. Attorneys, to do their jobs, had no
choice but to resist. From an objective viewpoint, on the current state of
facts, one cannot tell which account is correct.
As an aside, we note that had our suggested procedures for collaborative
decision making been in place for the categories of cases involved in the
firings, the impasse between many of the U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney
General might have been avoided. Indeed, it appears that at least some of the
U.S. Attorneys did not even know that their decisions were being questioned.
Even a simple dialogue could have prevented that happenstance.
More formalized collaborative decision making would have forced the
Attorney General to go on the record at an earlier stage, albeit internally
within DOJ. That would have required him either to take accountability for
opposing the U.S. Attorneys' prosecution choices or to effectively foreclose
himself from criticizing the choices after the fact. At the level below the
Attorney General, collaborative decision making in all probability would
have preempted at least some of the differences between the local U.S.
Attorneys' Offices and DOJ. At a minimum, the positions and motivations of
the various participants in the decisions would have been clarified, obviating
the uncertainty that has produced the attacks and counterattacks in the
discharge debate.
Participants in the debate, however, can draw more personal lessons from
our analysis. First and foremost, it is inappropriate for observers of the
prosecutorial function to jump to conclusions about prosecutors' motives.
Scenario 3 illustrates how difficult it is to identify motive objectively.
Viewed realistically, the issues underlying the discharges at root may have
had less to do with improper motivation than with a conflict between the
Attorney General's and U.S. Attorneys' beliefs on who should control
particular decisions. Concerns about improper motivations in the discharge
debate may have served only to muddy the issues.
The question of who should have been in control cannot be resolved
mechanically, either on the basis that the Attorney General was the U.S.
Attorneys' superior or on the basis that the U.S. Attorney and his staff had an
obligation to serve justice in the case they were handling. As we have seen,
the overall prosecution function requires the distribution of decision making
throughout DOJ, leaving each prosecutor to make the decisions which he is
equipped to make. But as we have also seen, characterizing decisions
accurately in order to allocate decision-making responsibility properly is
difficult. Scenario 3 suggests that even when we can accomplish these tasks,
problems of motivation may undermine our confidence in the allocations that
result.
That said, the willingness of the participants in the discharge debate to
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skip the step of determining the appropriate allocation of decision making
and rush to competing allegations regarding the motivation of the various
prosecutors is short-sighted. To the extent the discharges in fact represented
an effort by Attorney General Gonzales to exercise power over indictments,
one should first determine whether the indictments should have been subject
to his control in the ordinary course of events. If not, one would then need to
consider whether the specific decisions in question called for a departure
from the norm of local control of the indictment process, guided by
centralized policy (but not case-by-case) review.
We would be remiss, on the specific issue of bias raised by the discharge
debate, if we did not hazard some conclusions about who is most likely to be
affected by improper motivations in government corruption cases. The
appearance of partisanship is most pronounced when the Attorney General
asserts his authority, because he is most susceptible to influence by the White
House and lobbyists and the spokesperson for the current administration on
law enforcement issues. The U.S. Attorney, however, also is a political
appointee. He may view successful corruption cases against the opposing
party, or declinations in cases against his own party, as a route to political
advancement. Conversely he can advance his public persona by prosecuting
members of his party and appearing to be uncommonly objective. On the
surface, lower level prosecutors and line assistants seem least likely to be
partisan. Yet if they will be responsible for trying the corruption case, they
may be trigger-happy; successful prosecutions of high-profile cases can help
their careers.
If the goal were solely to minimize the potential for, and appearance of,
misconduct in such cases, the most appropriate approach might be to divide
charging and trial decision making.1 54 DOJ could assign joint responsibility
or oversight responsibility for charging decisions to career prosecutors less
likely to have partisan interests. If these career-prosecutor supervisors are
foreclosed from conducting the trials, they are unlikely to be affected by
considerations of career advancement. Such personnel would be in the best
position to impartially implement preexisting DOJ policy governing charging
in corruption cases, while at the same time giving weight to the investigating
prosecutors' understanding of the facts. Joint decision making of this type, in
theory, might serve as a workable check on partisanship and other forms of
bias.
154 See Uviller, supra note 18, at 1716 ("I believe that for the office of prosecutor
faithfully to discharge the incompatible roles of advocate and arbiter, the investigators
and adjudicators should be segregated from the advocates.").
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VII. LESSONS FOR PROSECUTORS
This Article's analysis of decision making in federal prosecutors' offices
leads to some conclusions that are applicable to federal and state prosecutors
alike. Some of the conclusions are predictable, others surprising. The
analysis confirms the need for a mix of internal policies, individualized
decision making, and supervision. It has identified factors that help
determine how decision making should, in theory, be allocated. Case-specific
considerations, however, sometimes affect that calculus. How to achieve the
right mix is a complex question, and failing to answer it can lead to both
internal tensions and public skepticism.
There will not always be a single optimal decisionmaker for a particular
question. Prosecutorial decisions often raise a host of issues touching on
criminal justice policy, non-criminal domestic or international policy, the
allocation of limited resources on both national and local levels, and case-
specific considerations that bear on the obligation to achieve individualized
justice. Actors at different levels of the process-in the federal system, the
Attorney General, career DOJ personnel, U.S. Attorneys, and line
assistants--each may have a superior claim to resolving some of these issues
because of their accountability, expertise, or likely objectivity. The fact that
decisions can be characterized in multiple ways also gives rise to varying
intuitions about the level at which the decisions should be made. Finally, the
potential for biased or partisan decision making suggests that no single actor,
unchecked, can be wholly trusted. While conventional wisdom may correctly
assume that a top-down structure will check rogue prosecutors and
compensate for well-meaning line prosecutors' unconscious biases, decision
making at the top introduces problems of its own. The right question will not
always be "who should decide?" Often, it will be, "by what multilateral
process should different actors' voices be heard on different aspects of a
decision to ensure that the best decision is made?"
For the federal system, our analysis highlights the consequences of the
Attorney General's multiple roles as policy-maker, administrator, and
supervisor. State District Attorneys share these functions, but their policy
visions typically will be more narrowly tailored to state criminal
prosecutions. One's initial intuition might be that, as the most accountable
actor in the prosecutorial decision-making process, the chief prosecutor
should maximize his involvement in matters implicating his roles. But
perhaps not. The greater the chief prosecutor's participation in allocating
resources based on considerations of criminal justice and other policy (in the
Attorney General's case, national policy), the more likely it becomes that the
chief prosecutor will be perceived to be pursuing illegitimate objectives. That
perception, in turn, can be reduced by eliminating his (and other political
appointees') participation in screening and day-to-day decision making in
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individual cases. When high level supervision is important, that might better
be left to non-partisan career prosecutors.
This Article's evaluation of its three scenarios has illustrated the
importance of transparency in decision making. Prosecutors tend to guard the
confidentiality of decision making in individual cases for good reason. Doing
so maintains the effectiveness of ongoing investigations and prosecutions and
protects the privacy and reputations of witnesses, suspects, and targets. And
there already is some measure of transparency regarding prosecutorial
policies (particularly DOJ policies) and their implementation, as well as
public information about the distribution of personnel and funding.
Nevertheless, many policies concerning special categories of cases, if they
exist at all, are too shrouded in secrecy. For example, what internal
regulations dictate which public corruption cases will be prosecuted, and
when? When will supervisory personnel intervene in, or oversee, individual
public corruption cases? Absent public answers to questions such as these,
observers have no basis to determine whether existing procedures have been
followed, whether the procedures have been improvised to fit a particular
case, and whether the procedures make sense. The secrecy of internal
policies fuels public skepticism and undermines accountability.' 55
Little wonder, then, that some label the recent discharge of U.S.
Attorneys as a scandal. 156 High-ranking DOJ officials, in effect, have said
"trust us." How and why should the public do so? Given the lack of
transparency, and the evident absence of a public pre-commitment to
objective internal decision-making processes, it is understandable that the
administration's critics perceive the administration's political appointees to
have been acting from partisan motives in an attempt to contravene U.S.
Attorneys' and their Assistants' authority to allocate resources prudently
within their districts.
This Article's analysis also suggests several especially interesting
challenges for local prosecutors. In the context of federal criminal
prosecutions, we have acknowledged the relevance of extra-criminal
domestic and foreign policy and the importance of national uniformity. Thus,
on certain questions, the Attorney General becomes the optimal
decisionmaker because of his access to the President and other national
155 The publication of prosecutorial policies is controversial, however. Compare
Abrams, supra note 32, at 25-31 (advocating publication of internal policy) and
Vorenberg, supra note 32, at 1558-59 ("[T]he lack of either a pre-announced set of rules
or after-the-fact accountability for exercise of discretionary power is inconsistent with
political accountability."), with William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an
Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1364-67 (1993) (identifying four reasons to
keep internal guidelines confidential).
156 See supra text accompanying note 6.
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policymakers. What, however, is the appropriate approach in state
prosecutions that implicate the same national policy considerations? State
prosecutors' decisions about how to treat non-citizens, for example-
including the decision of whether to implement the Vienna Convention
discussed in Scenario 1-have as much bearing on foreign policy as federal
prosecutors' decisions on the issue. Similarly, applications of one state's
criminal justice policy can create significant, potentially unfair disparity with
other jurisdictions' approaches. 157
High-level federal prosecutors have a comparative advantage in
rendering national policy directives and minimizing national dis-uniformity
because they can obtain information and guidance from the whole executive
branch. It is unclear on what basis state prosecutors should address national
policy issues. Federal authorities might seek to influence state prosecutors-
for example, through persuasion by DOJ or congressional exercises of
spending authority-but that is a relatively rare occurrence. State legislators
can give direction to state and local prosecutors about how to further policy
objectives other than law enforcement (e.g., foreign relations). But one
would expect them to do so infrequently because external limitations on
prosecutorial discretion tend to interfere with the norm of pursuing
individualized justice.
Ultimately, each elected District Attorney is a world unto himself. The
group of elected prosecutors might seek to develop and implement collective
understandings. But there is no history or routine of communication and
reciprocal influence among district attorneys within a state or nationally.
Moreover, joint decision making can undermine each elected prosecutor's
accountability to his or her individual constituencies. One district in a state
may elect a prosecutor precisely because of his measured approach to
charging and sentencing, while another may elect a prosecutor who pledges
to be as tough on crime as possible.
Thus, state prosecutors face a host of issues that are harder for them to
address than for federal prosecutors. To what extent should state prosecutors
express or implement policies that are not purely about criminal law
enforcement? What should be the source of those policies? To what extent
should various prosecutors within the state seek a unified state position, and
when should they respond to the issues based exclusively on the
expectations, social conditions, and resources in their limited districts? If
uniformity is important, how can it be achieved?
State prosecutors in small local agencies are at a particular disadvantage
in developing policy, institutional culture and history, and internal decision-
making structures that provide checks on partisanship and other misuses or
157 See Mellon et al., supra note 13, at 52 (analyzing differences among local
prosecutors "which affect the uniformity, the quality, and the equality of justice").
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abuses of authority.1 58 Imagine, for example, an elected county prosecutor in
a one-lawyer office who is politically ambitious and beholden to party
leaders. This prosecutor's office is accountable to the electorate, and
certainly the easiest to administer. But it is perhaps the hardest one in which
to check the biases of the individual prosecutor. Consider again the decision
of whether to bring public corruption charges, perhaps against a county
official. A U.S. Attorney's Office can reduce appearances of partisanship
through a combination of neutral, pre-established policies regarding charging
and a distribution of decision making that includes nonpartisan prosecutors.
These options are unavailable to the rural district attorney. The difficulty of
preserving the public trust illustrated by the recent "U.S. Attorneys scandal"
is magnified for the single-lawyer or small prosecutorial agency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The public outcry over the recent U.S. Attorney discharges is not
surprising. The actions of the administration, and the cases that apparently
precipitated its actions, were, at least on the surface, inherently partisan.
Naturally, Democrats and Republicans disagree about the import and
significance of what occurred.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney scandal, as many call it, teaches us a
great deal both about the appropriate allocation of authority in both federal
and state prosecutors' offices and about the way allegedly improper
prosecutorial decision making should be evaluated. Critics and proponents of
the administration's position have tended to discuss the issues in over-
simplified, black and white terms. This Article's analysis suggests that the
issues are far more complex.
Any assessment of the distribution of authority within a prosecutorial
agency requires an understanding of both the relative competencies of the
prosecutors at each level of the agency and the benefits and costs of
centralized decision making. This Article's inquiry has been designed, in
part, to further those understandings. Equally important is the recognition
that the complexities of prosecutorial decision making illustrated by our three
scenarios foreclose a mechanical allocation of authority. These complexities
are all implicated in the U.S. Attorneys scandal and must be considered
before assigning blame. On a forward-looking basis, the best response to
these complexities will often involve some form of joint, or collaborative,
decision making.
158 Office culture is not always considered an unalloyed good. See JOHN ASHCROFT,
NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING JUSTICE 90 (Center Street 2006)
(viewing institutional culture not as the product of hard-won experience, but rather as
"the process of fighting the last war, which is the bane of losing generals").
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In the end, this Article has not attempted to determine whether Attorney
General Gonzales acted properly in dismissing the eight U.S. Attorneys in
2006. But its analysis explains why the issues are more complicated than
they seem at first glance. The analysis may inform future debate about the
scandal. More importantly, however, it should provide a basis for prosecutors
of all stripes to think more deeply about the distribution of decision making
within their offices. That, in turn, should help them begin the process of
allocating authority in a coherent way.
